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Abstract
Legal paternalism is the interference by the state in the choice or choices o f citizens, for the 
good o f those citizens. There are strong intuitions for and against paternalism, which 
correspond to the value we place on well-being and self-determination, respectively. This 
thesis takes as a starting point a certain balance between these two values, and explores its 
ramifications at a number o f levels. Paternalism is taken to be justified only when the choices 
in question are not expressions o f self-determination. I first explore what it takes for a choice 
not to be an expression o f self-determination through a discussion o f voluntariness and its 
relationship to compatibilism in discussions o f freedom o f the will. I conclude that which 
choices are expressions o f self-determination is a matter to be settled in the practical domain. 
This idea is explored in a discussion o f decision-making competence. Finally, I outline the 
positive normative ethical evaluation o f self-determination which provides the justification 
for the anti-patemalist stance.
Introduction
I have taken the problem of paternalistic law as the starting point for an exploration o f ideas of 
freedom and responsibility at a number of levels. The structure o f the thesis arises from the 
following crucial idea: that the question of when it might be justifiable for the law to intervene in 
individual’ s choices, for their own good, turns out to be unanswerable without consideration of 
issues in more than just the normative ethical field o f philosophy. The outcome o f the thesis is a 
clarification o f interdependencies between metaphysical, ethical and political concepts, with the 
theme of paternalism providing both structure and an ever-present connection to pragmatic 
concerns.
In my first chapter I introduce the problem o f legal paternalism and set out some common 
intuitions that have traditionally structured debate about paternalism. Intuition is the coin o f 
moral philosophy, but its value in analytic circles depends on it being legitimised by concepts 
that have more theoretical depth. Joel Feinberg takes the first steps towards such a grounding of 
his anti-paternalistic intuitions, attempting to base them on a metaphysical distinction between 
voluntary and non-voluntary choices, and a positive ethical evaluation o f individual sovereignty. 
However, I argue that the distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary choice is not as clear 
as Feinberg would like it to be.
This problem is taken up in my second chapter. Given the vast literature on metaphysics in this 
area, my discussion will o f necessity be rather limited. But it will serve as a reminder o f the 
importance o f these issues to normative discourse, and a pointer for further research.
Various responses to the problem introduced in my first chapter are considered, but the most 
compelling one reverses the dependency of the ethical and the metaphysical: D.C. Dennett 
argues that our ethical practices should determine which actions we consider to be freely 
undertaken, rather than the other way around. On the basis o f this idea, then, the choices in 
which we in fact intervene, will be those which are non-voluntary.
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Putting the point bluntly like this exposes one great difficulty with it: that it seems to return us to 
the arbitrariness o f competing intuitions, when it comes to the justifiability o f paternalism (and 
blame, and other practical applications o f attributions o f responsibility.) My third chapter 
exposes this difficulty in detail through an exploration o f the key manner in which paternalism is 
practically instantiated: determinations of decision-making incompetence. I argue that one prima 
facie plausible account o f when we may ‘decide for others’ is in fact arbitrary in just this way, 
and thereby allows instances o f paternalism which would not be tolerated by (for instance) 
Feinberg’s more liberal theory of paternalism. I put forward one suggestion for reducing the role 
of intuition in competence determinations, but the fact remains that our intuitions even about 
why we may not interfere in a competent person’ s decisions, require a more solid grounding.
In my final chapter, therefore, I consider the respect for freedom that is the second element of 
any presumption against paternalism, seeking the normative basis for this respect. I consider 
particularly the difficulty o f generating respect for the freedom o f individuals at the political 
level, from normative ethical considerations: the problem of reconciling J.S. Mill’ s On Liberty 
and his Utilitarianism provides a classic illustration o f this problem. In the end, though, I argue 
that Mill’ s basic ideas if not his precise formulation give us the right grounding for strong liberal 
intuitions against legal paternalism. Legal paternalism can be rejected on a consequentialist 
account that takes a certain sort o f freedom as its goal.
Chapter 1
1.0 Introduction
In discussions o f the scope o f the criminal law, legal paternalism is often thought to be one 
potentially viable exception to M ill’ s ‘Harm Principle’ . According to the Harm Principle, the 
only justification for legal intervention in the private lives o f citizens is the prevention of 
harm to others. M ill’ s standpoint has become the touchstone for liberal (though not 
libertarian) accounts o f the limits o f the criminal law. Broadly, legal paternalism is the view 
that legal sanctions may also be justified in order to prevent people from harming themselves 
or consenting to being harmed by someone else. M y project is to develop a position 
according to which legal paternalism is unjustified. This thesis is deep rather than broad, in 
the sense that I wish to develop a viewpoint on my position at a number o f levels o f 
philosophical debate, from the political to the metaphysical.
In this chapter I characterise paternalistic behaviour and paternalistic law, and set forth the 
guiding intuitions o f the anti-patemalist stance. If proliferation is a mark o f success, the 
theoretical landscape o f this area is one o f the success stories o f reflective equilibrium: the 
same two basic liberal intuitions about paternalistic behaviour have made their way into a 
number o f theories o f what counts as justified, and what unjustified, paternalism. These 
intuitions are that a) in general, paternalistic intervention in the life o f another person is not 
permissible, and b) paternalistic intervention is permissible where the person in question is a 
child, or not in their right mind, or dangerously ignorant. Different theories give slightly 
different analyses o f when it is legitimate to interfere in someone’ s choices.
Joel Feinberg’ s is one careful and comprehensive example. Feinberg argues that voluntary 
choices are the expressions o f an individual’ s sovereignty, which is never rightfully ignored. 
Thus in general, paternalistic intervention in the life o f another person is not permissible. But 
non-voluntary choices, such as can be made in ignorance or mental incapacity, are not 
expressions o f sovereignty. Therefore, paternalistic intervention can sometimes be legitimate. 
But Feinberg’ s theory faces one immediate metaphysical problem, namely in the difficulty o f 
distinguishing voluntary choices from any other sort. We find the resolution o f this problem
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in the adoption o f the practical stance advocated by D.C. Dennett. In a sense, freedom will be 
taken to be constituted by our moral practices.
1.1 Paternalism
Attempts to understand exactly what it is for an action or policy to be paternalistic suffer both 
from the negative connotations o f the term, and from previous attempts at clarification which 
have muddied the waters. I will not give a survey o f various characterisations o f paternalism.
I want, rather, to put forward a characterisation and extend it. In the process some other 
attempts at definition will be rejected. This characterisation aims to be relatively neutral in 
respect o f the moral status o f paternalism; in particular, paternalism is not taken as a prima 
facie  wrong with no redeeming features. Nor am I concerned with paternalism from a 
particularly feminist perspective. The historical truth may be otherwise (the etymology of 
paternalism certainly misleadingly indicates otherwise), but in principle paternalism can be 
practised on anyone,, by anyone else.
David Archard defines paternalism as follows:
“P behaves paternalistically towards Q iff:
(1)P aims to bring it about that with respect to some state(s) o f affairs which concerns 
Q ’ s good Q ’ s choice or opportunity to choose is denied or diminished;
(2)P’ s belief that this behaviour promotes Q ’ s good is the main reason for P ’ s 
behaviour;
(3)P discounts Q ’ s belief that P ’ s behaviour does not promote Q ’ s good.”  (Archard 1990 
36)
Condition (1) -  the denial or diminishment o f choice -  is a necessary element o f a 
paternalistic action. A  person may act for the putpose o f promoting another’ s good, and do so 
against the opinion o f that person that the act is not in their interest, and yet not behave 
paternalistically. For example, imagine a teenager who rebels against the wealth o f his 
parents. He firmly believes that he is better o ff living by his own labour than accepting 
money from them. But his mother believes otherwise. She writes him a cheque for £ 500 000, 
and puts it in an envelope. She puts the envelope in a locker at the train station and gives the 
key to her son, telling him simply to open the locker if he ever changes his mind about . 
needing money.
This (generous) mother has not interfered in her son’ s life beyond handing him a key, though 
she has acted in the belief that she is promoting her son’ s good, against his belief that she 
isn’ t. She has fulfilled conditions (2) and (3). But intuitively, her action is not paternalistic in 
the way that it would have been had she, say, packed him off to an expensive boarding 
school, thereby denying his choices. This brings up a further important point about 
paternalism on this characterisation: Parental acts will often be paternalistic. The younger the 
child, the higher the proportion o f paternalistic acts (the fewer choices the child is allowed to 
make for herself.) This is a further reason to note that paternalism can not be universally 
wrong, although this first condition regarding the denial or diminishment o f choice will be 
part o f  the case against it.
A paternalistic act must clearly also aim to bring about the good o f the person concerned.
One who aims simply to bring it about that another’ s choice is diminished, discounting that 
other’ s opinion that the interference is not in their interest, is merely a malicious intervener. 
The parental aspect o f the etymological root o f ‘paternalism’ is here relevant: that it be for its 
object’ s good is a necessary element o f paternalism, and provides it with positive flavour for 
its advocates. To illustrate, picture a woman who one evening locks her protesting husband in 
the bathroom and leaves the house for a night out with friends. She denies her husband’ s 
choice to have the run o f the house while she is out, against his opinion that incarceration is 
not in his interest. Her action lacks the benevolent undertone necessary to an act o f 
paternalism. If she had locked him into the bathroom so that he couldn’ t get to the gun with 
which he’d threatened to shoot himself (but still against his view o f his own best interest, 
which he considers is to die), and left to get help, then her action could be considered 
paternalistic.
Finally, consider the last clause. The paternalist must act against what the person affected 
takes to be her own best interest. This clause counteracts the possibility that the person 
affected has chosen her diminishment o f choice. The classic case o f Odysseus and the sirens 
presents some difficulties. Odysseus instructs his crew to bind him so that he will not be 
tempted by the voices o f the sirens. Though he might beg them to release him, they must not 
-  his earlier choice is to overrule the later. In that their actions are in accordance with his 
overall choice, the crew are not behaving paternalistically. But in that they are denying his 
current choice (against what he currently takes to be his best interest), they do appeal' to be 
behaving paternalistically. What we need to show the necessity o f the third clause is not
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something o f the ‘don’ t let m e ..,’ form. In these cases choice cannot be separated from a 
person’ s opinion as to their best interests in the manner required: choice at a moment will 
always track opinion as to best interest at a moment. It is therefore ambiguous as to whether 
the intervention is paternalistic in these cases.
A better example case is one where a person becomes definitely committed to some desirable 
course o f action only if some antecedent condition is met. If Angela were offered a job  in 
Rome, for instance, she would be bound to take it, because she loves Italy and has always 
wanted to live there. It would also be wonderful for her career as a curator. If Amy pulls 
strings to get Angela a job  offer from a museum in Rome, she has diminished Angela’ s 
choice -  Angela is now bound to go and live and work in Rome. We can also presume that 
the act was for Angela’ s benefit, and not because Amy wanted to get rid o f her. But this act 
lacks the mcilevolent undertone o f paternalism -  intuitively, since it is not against what 
Angela takes to be her own best interest, it is not paternalistic. If Amy had had Angela 
appointed at a museum in Rome for the good o f her (Angela’ s) career, but against her desire 
to stay in Scotland with her family, then Am y’ s string-pulling would be paternalistic.
An act that meets all three conditions is paternalistic. The mother who packs her protesting 
son o ff to boarding school so that he will be properly educated behaves paternalistically, as 
does the wife who locks her suicidal husband in the bathroom. If Amy sends Angela 
protesting to a better life in Rome she behaves paternalistically. It should be clear from these 
examples that the ethical status o f paternalism is not straightforward.
Archard’ s definition differs from its predecessors in a number o f respects. Firstly, it does not 
focus on the restriction o f the freedom  o f  action o f the agent who is the object o f paternalistic 
behaviour. A conception o f paternalism as the restriction o f freedom o f action faces the 
following counter-example. Suppose a doctor decides to give an unconscious patient a life- 
saving blood transfusion, when she knows he would reject the transfusion if conscious. The 
doctor’s behaviour seems to be paternalistic but not restrictive o f her patient’ s freedom. He is 
unconscious, and so not free to act anyway. (Archard 1990 36; Gert & Culver (G&C) 46) 
Thus restriction o f freedom o f action cannot be the defining feature o f paternalistic 
behaviour.
Nor, Archard argues, does paternalistic behaviour necessarily involve doing something which 
“needs moral justification” , as conjectured by Gert and Culver. They suggest that “an 
essential feature o f paternalistic behaviour toward a person is the violation o f moral rules ... 
for example, the moral rules prohibiting deception, deprivation o f freedom or opportunity, or 
disabling.” (G&C 48) But the breaking o f a variety o f rules doesn’ t seem to be a necessary 
feature o f paternalistic behaviour. Archard cites an example o f Gerald Dworldn’ s: “A 
husband is under no moral obligation to inform his suicidal wife o f the whereabouts o f his 
sleeping pills. He acts paternalistically when he fails to do so, but violates no moral rule by 
his failure. [...] The husband seeks to diminish the w ife’ s opportunity o f choosing suicide by 
denying her access to the pills.” (Archard 1990 37)
This is actually a somewhat tricky case, since the husband is failing to act rather than actively 
intervening. If his wife does not know that he has sleeping pills, and he neglects to tell her, he 
does not seem to be behaving paternalistically on Archard’ s model either. The wife’ s range o f 
choices never included overdosing on her husband’ s sleeping pills, and he has not diminished 
this range o f choice. Suppose, then, that she knew o f the existence o f the pills, asked him 
where they were, and he refused to tell. Then his behaviour seems to be paternalistic. But it 
seems quite right to balk at saying that he has violated a moral rule, though some question 
remains as to whether his action was wholly, morally unproblematic. If his wife is capable o f 
making a rational decision then there is at least some form o f disrespect involved in his 
action.
Archard distinguishes paternalistic behaviour from paternalistic reasons for acting. A 
paternalistic reason is “ a belief that a behaviour promotes the good o f some other, together 
with a belief that this first belief is not shared by the other, and o f course a desire to promote 
the good o f the other.” (Archard 1990 38) The idea o f a paternalistic reason for behaviour 
allows us to capture the paternalistic element o f behaviours that fail to fully meet the terms o f 
the definition. Consider again the mother who sends her errant son to an expensive boarding 
school in another town. But suppose this time that the son doesn’ t really want to rebel against 
his parents’ wealth: he was deviously acting rebelliously in order to get sent away. He wants 
to be wealthy, but also to have the freedom o f living away from his parents. Then we might 
be hesitant about saying that the mother behaves paternalistically. She hasn’ t acted against 
her son’ s belief regarding his own good, though she thinks she has. But we can still say that 
she acts for paternalistic reasons. This distinction is made largely to keep the definition of
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paternalism clear and precise, since it is debatable whether the mother behaves 
paternalistically according to common usage o f the term.
1.2 Legal paternalism
Archard’ s conception o f paternalism seems to conform to prephilosophical ideas with respect 
to its classifications o f which behaviours are paternalistic and which aren’ t, and is precise 
enough to provide solid ground for the discussion ahead. We may need to make some 
modifications to extend this tidy definition o f paternalism to the law. Condition (1) can be left 
relatively intact. Where Q stands for any citizen o f a particular state:
(la ) The state aims to bring it about that with respect to some state(s) o f affairs which 
concerns Q ’ s own good Q ’ s choice or opportunity to choose is denied or diminished.
W e can, perhaps, legitimately talk about the ‘beliefs’ o f  the state, as shorthand for the 
consensus o f expert opinion available to policy-makers. So, for instance, the state may 
‘believe’ that smoking causes lung cancer. The state’ s ‘belief’ that smoking causes lung 
cancer prompts certain policies and programs: it may be part o f the basis for high taxes on 
cigarettes, and for advertising campaigns warning o f the dangers o f smoking. W e can thus 
modify Archard’ s condition (2) for the state:
(2a) The state’ s belief that this policy or law promotes the good o f Q is the main reason 
for the implementation o f that policy or law.
The tricky part o f this definition o f paternalism for the law is condition (3), because the force 
o f the law extends to an entire population. Sometimes the individuals affected will be o f the 
opinion that the law is in their interests, sometimes they won’ t. Most people, for instance, feel 
that wearing a seatbelt is in their own best interest. But there may be a minority who disagree, 
either because they value their freedom over their health, or because they don’ t believe 
seatbelts actually improve their safety. W e can thus reformulate condition (3) as follows:
(3a) The state discounts any belief Q might have that its law or policy does not promote 
Q ’ s good.
This allows us to count as paternalistic laws which are not strictly paternalistic in every 
application, such as the law on seatbelt use.
1.3 The intuitive cases for and against
Prima facie, there are many cases o f paternalistic interference at the personal level that 
appeal* ethically questionable to anyone with a robust notion o f personal autonomy. For 
instance, the medical profession has learned in recent years that patients resent having 
decisions about their treatment taken for them, regardless o f the years their doctors have 
spent studying medicine -  in other words, regardless o f the fact that doctor really does often 
know best. The doctrine o f informed consent is the result o f this basic reaction against 
paternalism. The reason the word has such negative connotations is that people value making 
their own choices, and have firm beliefs about what is and is not in their best interests. 
Paternalism, though it is motivated by the desire to help, ignores those choices and the beliefs 
regarding them.
However, sometimes paternalism (as I have argued it should be characterised) does seem to 
be justified. The simplest case is probably that o f  young children. For an act to be 
paternalistic at all, the subject must be (or have been) capable o f choice and b e lie f-  
otherwise the conditions o f denial or diminishment o f choice and ignoring the beliefs o f the 
subject cannot be met. So the acts parents make on behalf o f babies and very young children 
cannot be regarded as paternalistic. But once a child is old enough to make choices and have 
beliefs about what is in his interest, he is old enough to have those choices denied and those 
opinions disregarded.
This sort o f paternalistic behaviour is not usually as malicious as it sounds on this abstract 
characterisation. Every time a parent gives a child a piece o f fruit instead o f the sweet she 
wants and thinks best for her, he is behaving paternalistically -  but it seems to be warranted. 
Something about the quality o f her choices and beliefs (which we will come to later) seems to 
warrant denying the one and ignoring the other. Similarly, a psychiatric patient may 
legitimately be detained at a hospital if she is judged to be an immediate danger to herself. 
Such an allowance seems reasonable, as does the behaviour o f a person in preventing his 
drunken friend from stepping out into traffic. Paternalism seems outrageous when it is aimed 
at capable adult decision-makers; in many other cases, intuitively, it may be legitimate.
But in the legal domain this modest view has not always prevailed. The ‘one-part’ case is one 
in which an individual simply wishes to act in such a way as to harm herself -  for instance,
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by using dangerous drugs. The ‘two-party’ case is one where an individual requests or 
contracts another to commit the injury upon her. Joel Feinberg formulates the distinction 
between what he calls ‘ soft’ and ‘hard’ legal paternalism as follows:
“The distinction, which is o f the first importance, has to do with the weight attached 
to the voluntariness o f a person’ s action in the one-party case and the voluntariness 
o f his consent in the two-party case. Hard paternalism will accept as a reason for 
criminal legislation that it is necessary to protect competent adults, against their will, 
from the harmful consequences even o f their fully voluntary choices and 
undertakings. [...] It is not as clear that “soft paternalism” is “paternalistic” at all, in 
any clear sense. Certainly its motivating spirit seems closer to the liberalism o f Mill 
than to the protectiveness o f hard paternalism. Soft paternalism holds that the state 
has the right to prevent self-regarding harmful conduct (so far it looks paternalistic) 
when but only when that conduct is substantially nonvoluntary, or when temporary 
intervention is necessary to establish whether it is voluntary or not”  (Feinberg 12). 
On the characterisation o f legal paternalism given above, what Feinberg terms ‘soft’ 
paternalism is paternalism: the state aims, by law, to diminish the choices o f individuals, for 
their own good, regardless o f their view o f their own interests. It is just that the choice 
involved, in the case o f ‘ soft’ paternalism as opposed to ‘hard’ , is taken to be less than fully 
voluntary.
So how is Feinberg’ s soft paternalism “closer to the liberalism o f Mill” ? M ill’ s Haim 
Principle is the classic statement o f the scope o f the law; it says that the state is justified in 
interfering in the private lives o f citizens only to prevent harm to others. The law may not 
prevent a competent adult from harming himself: “ His own good, either physical or moral, is 
not a sufficient warrant” (Mill On Liberty 15). M ill’ s view contrasts what Feinberg would 
call ‘hard’ paternalism, the view that the state may legitimately prevent competent adults 
from harming themselves.
Mill goes on to write that complete freedom from intervention is only applicable to “human 
beings in the maturity o f their faculties” (15). W e are justified in protecting children, for 
instance, from their own harmful choices. Further, we are allowed to intervene in order to 
ascertain whether a person knows what he is doing, if  the harm is imminent. M ill’ s famous 
example o f the dangerous bridge sets out his views on the justifiability o f various forms o f 
intervention:
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“ it is a proper office o f  public authority to guard against accidents. If either a public 
officer or any one else saw a person attempting to cross a bridge which had been 
ascertained to be unsafe, and there were no time to warn him o f his danger, they 
might seize him and turn him back, without any real infringement o f his liberty; for 
liberty consists in doing what one desires, and he does not desire to fall in the river. 
Nevertheless, when there is not a certainty, but only a danger o f mischief, no one but 
the person himself can judge o f the sufficiency o f the motive which may prompt him 
to incur the risk: in this case, therefore (unless he is a child, or delirious, or in some 
state o f  excitement or absorption incompatible with the use o f  the reflecting faculty), 
he ought, I conceive, to be only warned o f the danger; not forcibly prevented from 
exposing himself to it”  (Mill 118 [my emphasis]).
If Feinberg’ s account o f the ‘non-voluntariness’ o f certain choices agrees with M ill’ s 
(italicised) exceptions to the general rule o f  non-interference, then Feinberg’ s soft 
paternalism is indeed in the spirit o f  M ill’ s liberalism. Prima facie  the two do agree: choices 
that Feinberg classes as non-voluntary are those made when the “ use o f the reflecting faculty” 
is somehow severely diminished -  by ignorance, illness, drugs, or insufficient maturity, as 
well as those that are more clearly forced. They are not the “ “Unreasonable 
choices” ...com m only made by fully competent persons in full command o f their faculties” 
(Feinberg 106). W e will look more carefully at what conditions contribute to the non­
voluntariness o f choices later on.
Most o f the laws that prevent people from inflicting harm upon themselves seem to arise 
from a number o f motives, or at least can be justified from a perspective other than 
paternalism, if necessary. For example, the view that the wearing o f seatbelts should be 
legally enforced may be a hard paternalist stance -  the law does diminish the choice o f 
individuals against (some of) their judgement o f their own best interests. The stance is hard 
paternalism if the motive is in fact the protection o f the interests o f those individuals. But if 
the motive is to protect the bulk o f taxpayers from the jointly-felt medical burden o f 
foolhardy drivers, the law is not paternalistic. Probably, the law is a mixture, since a state (as 
a conglomerate o f individuals with varying interests and levels o f  power) can rarely be said to 
have a single motive for any o f its policies.
Similar complexities arise in debates about the legalisation o f cannabis and harder drugs. On 
the one hand, if the law is in place to protect citizens from their choices regarding these
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drugs, it is paternalistic. But it may be grounded in a desire to protect the public from the 
misbehaviour o f drug users, or to protect children from potential drug use problems, or it may 
be based on moral disapprobation o f drug use. In these cases, rather than hard paternalism, 
the law is based on the Harm Principle, soft paternalism, or legal moralism respectively. It is 
only where a law aims to protect capable decision-making adults from their own choices that 
it falls into the category o f hard paternalism, but such laws are by no means unheard of.
It is difficult to think o f examples o f laws based on the principle o f soft paternalism, perhaps 
because, as Feinberg writes, the principle is more naturally seen as a restriction on 
legislation. It says that “ a certain class o f alleged justifying reasons are not valid. It is not an 
acceptable reason in support o f proposed criminal legislation that it is necessary to prevent 
the sorts o f  interferences soft paternalism permits. Interfering with an apparently demented 
suicide attempt, for example, should not be a crime”  (Feinberg 15). Soft paternalism also 
legitimates the detention o f some psychiatric patients, as mentioned above. Also, the 
principle o f soft paternalism is more likely to be the basis for non-punitive state interference 
with liberty: “ denying applications, invalidating contracts, issuing temporary restraining 
orders, imposing civil commitment, and so on”  (15). But as mentioned earlier, soft 
paternalism may be part o f a mixed justification for laws governing sexual conduct, drug use 
and freedom o f speech. Some restrictions in these areas might be argued for on the grounds 
o f protecting children from the harmful consequences o f their own choices (though whether 
this is a good argument is another matter).
1.4 The presumptive case against hard paternalism and for soft paternalism
Mill and Feinberg both argue against a hard paternalist approach in the law, opting instead for 
the soft paternalist stance. The presumptive case against hard paternalism is not based solely 
on respect for a person’ s choices, but on respect for autonomy, self-determination, or 
sovereignty. M ill’ s argument against hard paternalism is based on a number o f  factors, one o f 
them being the wider value o f individuality -  more on this later. But Feinberg advocates that 
we use an analogy between persons and sovereign states to get to the heart o f  what is wrong 
with hard paternalism. Sovereignty (in the political sense) consists in a right o f self­
determination (Feinberg 47). According to Feinberg, sovereign states may have important 
and rewarding relationships with other states (in contrast with the conception o f autonomy as 
mere independence that, for example, O ’Neill discusses) but they are essentially self- 
governing within their own domain.
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Feinberg writes:
“Perhaps the fairest way o f putting the presumptive case against legal paternalism is 
to say that even when conjoined with other principles, it has at best a very limited 
conception o f personal autonomy. Even though it is consistent with the recognition 
o f a person’ s right o f self-determination, it subordinates that right to the person’ s 
own g o o d ’ (Feinberg 57).
What is a person’ s good?
“A  majority view, associated with the writings o f Plato, Aristotle, Rousseau, Hegel, 
and Mill, among others, identifies a person’ s good ultimately with his self-fulfilment 
-  a notion that is certainly not identical with that o f autonomy or the right o f self­
determination. self-fulfilment is variously interpreted, but it is usually understood to 
require the development o f one’ s chief aptitudes into genuine talents in a life that 
gives them scope, the unfolding o f all basic tendencies and inclinations, both those 
that are common to the species and those that are peculiar to the individual, and the 
active realization o f the universal human propensities to plan, design, and make 
order, self-fulfilment, so construed, is not the same as achievement and not to be 
confused with pleasure or contentment, though achievement is often highly 
fulfilling, and fulfillment is usually highly gratifying” (Feinberg 57).
Self-fulfilment and the right to self-determination are clearly closely linked. Health and 
material and psychological welfare are also related to self-fulfilment, probably instrumentally 
so.
Feinberg lists four possibilities as to exactly how self-determination and self-fulfilment are 
linked. The first view is that self-determination is valuable solely in terms o f its being 
instrumental to self-fulfilment. How does self-determination work towards a person’ s 
achieving self-fulfilment? There might be more than one mechanism. But primarily, a person 
may be taken to have greater knowledge o f what will fulfill them than anyone else will.
Being self-determining will allow them to apply this knowledge to the maximisation o f self­
fulfilment. This is the view most naturally linked to paternalism: as soon as self­
determination stops being instrumental to a person’ s good, it may be disregarded. So, for 
instance, if a person’ s self-determination clashes with their health, self-determination may be 
sacrificed in order to preserve health, and therefore the overall good o f the person, or their 
ability to achieve self-fulfilment in the future. But an anti-paternalist with this view o f the
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relationship between self-determination and self-fulfilment might stress the instrumental 
importance o f self-determination for self-fulfilment (Feinberg 59). No-one can know a 
person’ s good better than they can, and even being in perfect health won’ t help them if they 
cannot achieve what they want in other areas.
If the stress put on the instrumental value o f self-determination is heavy enough, we shift to 
the second view, where “ the relation between a person’ s right o f self-determination and his 
good o f self-fulfilment is not merely a strong instrumental connection but an invariable 
correspondence. On this view, whatever harm a person might do to “his own good” by 
foolishly exercising his free choice would in every case necessarily be outweighed by the 
greater harm done by outside interference and direction” (Feinberg 59). Self-determination is 
still instrumental to self-fulfilment, but it has become an overriding consideration: its 
instrumental value is such that it overcomes other considerations. However, if the value of 
self-determination is truly only instrumental to self-fulfilment, it is hard to see how its value 
could overcome all other considerations. If everything required to make a person fulfilled 
could be brought about without her effort, she would be just as fulfilled as if  she had 
determined the outcome herself. This is what it means to say that self-determination is 
instrumental to self-fulfilment. Thus, on the instrumental views, hard paternalism would be 
justified if it created an increase in the overall good o f the person large enough to offset the 
loss o f self-determination.
The third and fourth views, according to Feinberg, take the right o f self-determination to be 
entirely basic. Self-determination is not instrumental to self-fulfilment or even a part o f it. It 
is something to be valued independently o f self-fulfilment. Here, we have the potential for 
clashes between self-determination and self-fulfilment. On the third view, self-determination 
will always win in these clashes: it will over-ride self-fulfilment. Here there is clearly no 
room for hard paternalist intervention: the denial o f self-determination can never be 
legitimate. On the fourth view self-determination and self-fulfilment are to be balanced 
against one another, allowing some scope for paternalistic considerations when some 
important aspect o f a person’ s good may be damaged by their choices (Feinberg 60).
It is the third view that Feinberg finds consistent with his model o f personal sovereignty, and 
that he prefers.
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“When the exercise o f a person’ s sovereign right conflicts with what is truly good 
for him (those “rare cases” ), [my view] defends the choice nevertheless. If that 
seems an absurd result, the reader should put himself in the position o f the person 
interfered with. Presumably, if he genuinely chose the alternative that is in fact bad 
for him, he did not choose it because he believed it was bad for him. That would be 
so irrational that it would put the voluntariness o f his choice in doubt, and.. .the soft 
paternalistic strategy might then be used to justify interference on liberal grounds. If 
he chose that alternative because he believed it good (or at least not bad) for himself, 
then either the difference between him and his would-be constrainers is over some 
matter o f fact about which he is simply mistaken, in which case he would welcome 
being set right, or it is about the nature o f his self-interest, or the reasonableness, 
given his values, o f the risks he wishes to assume. In that case, the disagreement 
would be more intractable, and the reader would not welcome having his own 
judgment overruled, or the “ better values” o f  others substituted for his own” 
(Feinberg 62).
W e can also conceive o f a person sacrificing her own good for the sake o f others, or some 
“ treasured cause” , or deliberately valuing a short-term gain over a long-term good. To the 
extent that these choices are truly voluntary (as we shall see), they are to be respected as 
expressions o f the right o f self-determination.
Once we have the grounding for the presumptive case against hard paternalism in place, it is 
easy to capture the justification for Feinberg’ s ‘ soft’ paternalism. Paternalism, we have seen, 
consists in the denial or diminishment o f choice. What is wrong with it is that it violates the 
right o f self-determination. But if a certain choice is not an expression o f the right o f self­
determination then the paternalism is not presumptively wrong. What choices are not 
expressions o f the right to self-determination? According to Feinberg, substantially non­
voluntary choices can be denied without violating the right to self-determination. ‘Soft’ 
paternalism will allow interference in these choices.
1.5 Voluntary and non-voluntary choices
The distinction between fully voluntary and non-voluntary choices is crucial to Feinberg’ s 
account o f what is justified legal paternalism. It is the key to his ‘soft paternalist strategy’ : 
Feinberg uses the idea o f substantially non-voluntary choices to ground his view that the
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paternalistic interferences that look reasonable are in fact justifiable on liberal grounds. 
Interference in a choice that is substantially non-voluntary is significantly different from 
interference in a choice that is voluntaiy. The difference is significant enough that the denial 
or diminishment o f non-voluntary choices may be justified, while denying voluntary choices 
is never legitimate.
The natural beginning o f a discussion about voluntariness is with Aristotle. Aristotle’ s 
conception o f voluntariness is notoriously strict -  that is, he classes as voluntary any action 
which “has its first principle in the person himself when he knows the particular 
circumstances o f the action” (NE III 1111b). The two factors that contribute to an action’ s 
failing to be voluntary are thus ignorance and force. Aristotle has a rather narrow conception 
o f force: a person is forced to act only if their body is literally externally moved (NE III). 
“What is forced, then, seems to be what has an external first principle, where the person 
forced contributes nothing” (NE 1110b). Being moved by a force o f nature such as a flood or 
hurricane is an example o f non-voluntary action on Aristotle’ s account, or being physically 
moved by another person. But that person threatening your life if you fail to move does not 
count as a mitigating factor against voluntariness. “ In fact, the person acts voluntarily, 
because in actions like this the first principle o f moving the limbs that serve as instruments 
lies in him; and where the first principle lies in a person, it is in his power to act or not to act” 
(1110a).
Though the mitigating factors o f ignorance and force seem still to be a useful way o f 
understanding what it is for an action to be non-voluntary, most modern writers would 
expand Aristotle’ s conception o f force. In particular, we might want to allow that there may 
be internal sources o f force, and external sources o f force which are not purely physical.
Thus Feinberg distinguishes internal from external sources o f compulsion; internal sources 
include “Neurotic compulsions, obsessions, inhibitions and incapacities” (Feinberg 151). 
These are all factors that will tell against the voluntariness o f an individual’ s action. Under 
the heading o f external non-physical compelling forces, we may wish to include 
brainwashing and hypnosis along with coercion. So non-voluntary choices will be those made 
under the influence o f drugs, or agitation, or certain mental illnesses, or when a person is 
insufficiently mature -  in other words, in complex cases o f ignorance and internal force.
Note that as soon as these internal elements o f force are added (if not before) the boundary 
between voluntary and non-voluntary actions starts to become blurred. Some actions 
performed (or choices made) under conditions o f internal or external non-physical force we 
may want to say are completely involuntary, akin to being swept down a river. But, for 
example, in the case o f coercion we can clearly see a continuum between non-voluntary and 
substantially voluntary (i.e. voluntary enough for the purposes o f the law) choices. Coercion, 
Feinberg writes, closes o ff alternative possibilities to a person by increasing their cost to an 
unacceptable level (“Your money or your life!” ) (Feinberg 192). Typically, threats are made 
in order to drive the coercee to a particular action. Alternatively, an offer may be coercive (“I 
will pay o ff your debts if you sleep with me” ). Handing over your money to the gunman is a 
clear case o f a non-voluntary choice -  though there was an alternative (your life), it was 
unacceptably costly. But if you are told “ Sleep with me or I will be annoyed!” , the decision to 
acquiesce (bailing other factors) would appeal* to be substantially voluntary. In the case 
where the choice turns out to be substantially non-voluntary on Feinberg’ s account, it is not 
thought literally to be the result o f  psychological compulsion -  it is rather that the alternative 
has been made unacceptably costly.
Why might it be all right to interfere in a person’ s substantially non-voluntary choice? It 
might be argued that substantially non-voluntary choices are really like someone else's 
choices, and so the person who is harmed by their own substantially non-voluntary choice is 
really harmed by someone else. The drunken friend is a different person to the friend while 
sober. Pulling the drunken friend out o f traffic is just stopping him from harming his alter 
ego, the sober friend. Thus soft legal paternalism would really fall under the Harm Principle. 
Such cases as the legal allowance o f detention in a psychiatric ward would count as 
preventing the suicidal patient from harming another (her later self), just as the detention o f a 
dangerously psychotic patient is allowed on the grounds that he may cause harm to other 
people. But Feinberg rightly denies the “ absurd fiction” that “ such factors as ignorance are 
themselves “other persons” who can be targets o f legal threats” (Feinberg 14). If the 
foregoing model is taken seriously, the suicidal patient may not only be restrained, but also 
be punished for any harm she might inflict on ‘herself’ -  since this is really harm to another. 
But this is absurd. There is no second person who may be sanctioned for her behaviour 
against the first. It cannot, therefore, be the case that soft paternalism simply falls under the 
Haim Principle.
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Feinberg’ s account o f substantially non-voluntary choices -  those that may rightfully be 
interfered with -  is based on a comparison with the antithesis o f perfect voluntary choice: 
involuntary action. An involuntary act is one that literally can’ t be helped; it is externally 
forced on the Aristotelian m odel In fact, involuntariness and choice are conceptually 
incompatible. Unlike Aristotle, Feinberg holds a relatively small class o f actions to be fully 
voluntary. They are those that are made under ideal conditions: the agent has full knowledge 
o f current circumstances and possible outcomes, and suffers from no failure o f cognition or 
will. Needless to say, Feinberg’ s ideal o f  perfect voluntariness is practically unattainable. But 
choices can lie on a scale between perfect voluntariness and involuntariness. Substantially 
non-voluntary choices appear to approach (in the mathematical sense) involuntariness 
(Feinberg 104-105).
For Feinberg, what is wrong with paternalism, when it is wrong, is that it is a violation o f 
sovereignty -  a person’ s right to self-determination. But interfering with someone’ s 
involuntary action clearly does not infringe on her right to self-determination. The act is not 
even chosen; it cannot, therefore, be an expression o f self-determination. Insofar as non­
voluntary choices approach involuntary choices, then, neither are they expressions o f self­
determination. It is necessary for Feinberg that the ‘non-voluntary’ choices made while 
drunk, ‘neurotic’ , and so on, are seen as approaching involuntary ‘choice’ : this provides a 
strong justification for his soft paternalism. It is justified by the fact that it isn’ t interfering 
with true self-determination at all. For Feinberg, personal sovereignty is a trumping 
consideration -  we aren’ t justified in violating sovereignty, even when a person’ s life is at 
stake. To justify any sort o f intervention, then, Feinberg must argue that the choice at hand 
does not fall in the protected domain o f sovereignty.
But note that Feinberg is wrong to attempt to contrast soft and hard paternalism: soft 
paternalism, though it may be valid where hard paternalism is not, is nonetheless paternalism. 
Soft paternalism’ s characterisation as such (and not as “ anti-paternalism” ) can be based on its 
fulfilling the criteria for paternalism set out above. When some policy is made with the 1 
intention o f protecting people from their own substantially non-voluntary choices -  for 
instance, if poker machines are banned from pubs (presuming that patrons will be under the 
influence o f alcohol when they use the machines) -  all the criteria for paternalism are met. It 
seems that the state aims to bring it about that with respect to some state o f affairs that 
concerns Q ’ s own good Q ’ s opportunity to choose is denied (Q can no longer choose to
gamble while she drinks). The state’ s belief that this policy promotes the good o f Q is the 
main reason for the implementation o f that policy, and the state discounts any belief Q might 
have that the policy does not promote Q ’ s good. The first condition is clearly the crucial one: 
the crux o f paternalism is the usurpation o f choices. Where an act is involuntary, there really 
is no choice made at all. In cases where non-voluntariness is practically indistinguishable 
from involuntariness, we may wish to say the same o f non-voluntary ‘choices’ . But in other 
cases o f non-voluntary choice -  even substantially non-voluntary choice -  it must be 
admitted that a choice really is being made. It may not be the choice that would be made in a 
calm, reflective frame o f mind, but as a choice its denial or diminishment is paternalistic.
One last thing we should note about Feinberg’ s account o f the voluntariness/non­
voluntariness distinction is that standards o f voluntariness -  how voluntary a choice must be 
before it is immune from paternalistic interference -  may vary. In particular, standards o f 
voluntariness will vary with the riskiness o f the activity to be undertaken. “Most harmful 
choices, like most choices generally, fall somewhere in between the extremes o f full 
voluntariness and complete involuntariness. It follows that we may formulate relatively strict 
(high) standards o f voluntariness or relatively low standards o f voluntariness in deciding, in a 
given context and for a given purpose, whether a dangerous choice is voluntary enough to be 
immune from interference” (104). In practice, the outcome o f this qualification is that the 
riskier the action to be undertaken, the greater the degree o f voluntariness that will be 
required o f the chooser. Further, the more permanent or irrevocable the potential damage, the 
greater the degree o f voluntariness the person making the decision will need to display (119­
120). If the person falls short o f these higher standards o f voluntariness, it will be legitimate 
to paternalistically interfere in their choice.
1.6 Conclusion
There is a conceptual distinction between involuntary acts and voluntary choices. Involuntary 
acts cannot be thought o f as the outcome o f choice at all, while voluntary acts, though they 
may fall short o f the ideal o f a perfect understanding o f consequences and a calm mental 
state, are the result o f choices we make. But, intuitively, the more the voluntariness o f an act 
falls short o f this ideal -  the more factors we are ignorant of, the more agitated we are -  the 
closer our choice comes to being involuntary.
The second part o f Feinberg’ s story introduces the nonnative notions required for a 
distinction between justified and unjustified paternalism. The value introduced is personal 
sovereignty, which Feinberg argues is a trumping consideration. Our right to personal 
sovereignty wins over all other considerations in judgements about our good.
Involuntary acts are certainly not expressions o f sovereignty, or self-determination. I do not 
even choose to breathe, or for my heart to beat. I do not choose to stumble into traffic, and the 
person who pulls me out o f danger is not violating my sovereignty. There is nothing wrong 
with what he does. Insofar as choices approach involuntariness, then, there is nothing wrong 
with interfering in them. (In fact there may be everything right with interfering in them, as in 
the traffic case.) Thus Feinberg uses the conceptual distinction between involuntary and 
voluntary acts, and the continuum postulated between them, along with an argument for the 
value o f sovereignty, to ground an ethical distinction between justifiable and unjustifiable 
paternalism. Interference in voluntary choices is unjustifiable, while the usurpation o f choices 
that are substantially non-voluntary is justified. In the second chapter we look more closely at 
this distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary choices.
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Chapter 2
2.0 Introduction
In the previous chapter I set out some crucial distinctions, provided solid definitions to 
ground the discussion to follow, and began to explore some o f the difficulties in determining 
the justifiability o f paternalism. I extended Archard’ s basic definition o f paternalism to the 
legal context, and went on to look at Feinberg’ s distinction between soft and hard 
paternalism. For Feinberg, hard paternalism involves the usurpation o f even voluntary 
choices, where soft paternalism is the denial or diminishment o f substantially non-voluntary 
choices. Hard paternalism is presumptively in need o f justification where soft paternalism is 
not, because hard paternalism is disrespectful o f  the self-determination o f the individual, 
where, on Feinberg’ s account, soft paternalism is not. Soft paternalism involves the 
usurpation o f choices that are not properly thought o f as expressions o f self-determination.
In this chapter I outline some problems with Feinberg’ s characterisation o f soft and hard 
paternalism in terms o f non-voluntariness. To speak o f coercive ‘compulsion’ or mental 
‘pressure’ is to speak metaphorically, generating puzzles about identity and responsibility. 
How do we make a distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary choices, when, firstly, 
both can be made by the same person in the same state and, secondly, the sceptic says there 
are no voluntary choices at all? The distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary choices 
that Feinberg needs to make to ground his position needs a metaphysical basis. I reject one 
account o f such a basis and tentatively accept another.
Feinberg’ s theory o f paternalism and when it is justified has two major aspects, the 
distinction between voluntary and non-voluntary choices and the value that is placed on 
individual sovereignty. In this chapter we are questioning the basis o f the first aspect, which 
takes us into issues o f metaphysics. Though problems o f moral and criminal responsibility are 
in recent times usually discussed without reference to such issues, I believe it is useful to be 
reminded o f their importance in grounding any coherent philosophical ethic. However, given 
the complexity o f the metaphysics o f freedom (and the vastness o f the philosophical literature 
in this area) this discussion does not aim for firm answers. It is intended rather to flag the 
relevant issues and to be a pointer for further research. The ensuing chapters will take us into
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a discussion o f the second aspect o f Feinberg’ s theory, the value that is put on individual 
sovereignty or self-determination.
2.1 The Van Gogh Problem
Let’ s now take a closer look at the conceptual distinction between voluntary and non­
voluntary choices. Involuntary acts are the model for Feinberg’ s ‘non-voluntary’ choices, and 
the basis for his claim that paternalistic interference in non-voluntary choices is justified. 
What is involuntary is not even a matter o f choice; it is pointless to desire control over the 
involuntary, and arguing for the value o f self-determination in the sphere o f the involuntary 
would be absurd. Feinberg presents non-voluntary choices as analogous to the involuntary, 
though the fact that a choice can be non-voluntary indicates an immediate disanalogy. In 
likening non-voluntary choices to the involuntary Feinberg is making use o f the fact that we 
think metaphorically o f coerced and irrational acts (classically non-voluntary) as forced. It is 
this metaphorical link that sanctions the step from the justifiability o f intervention in 
involuntary acts to the justifiability o f intervention in non-voluntary choices.
However, the fact that non-voluntary choices aren’ t literally compelled in the same way that 
involuntary choices are creates problems for Feinberg’ s view. W e can imagine Van Gogh, at 
least at some stages, feeling the same sense o f  compulsion to paint as he did to mutilate his 
own ear. Both the artistic expression and the self-mutilation on Feinberg’ s account would 
seem to be substantially non-voluntary choices, if Van Gogh is in the same mental condition 
when both acts occur; Van Gogh’ s self-mutilation seems to be an uncontroversial case o f 
non-voluntary action. But the idea that paternalistic denial o f the choice to paint mad but 
beautiful pictures can be justified is ludicrous. On the other hand, there may have been 
justification for preventing the self-mutilation.
It is not simply that there is necessary but not sufficient cause for intervention in the case of 
painting. Certainly, we usually require there to be an element o f danger to a person before we 
intervene paternalistically (“ for his own good” ). Given the importance o f painting to the 
identity o f  the artist, paternalism seems simply unjustifiable. Van Gogh wrote to his brother 
“ And really, as for the artist’ s madness.. .1 do not say that I especially am not affected 
through and through, but I say and will maintain that our antidotes and consolations may,
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with a little good will, be considered ample compensation” (Van Gogh, quoted in Cabanne 
169).
The consolation is in the feeling o f pride the artist can take in his work. The flip side o f 
freedom is responsibility -  not only moral responsibility, but the talcing o f responsibility for 
one’ s own life and choices that creates an individual character. At least in some important 
cases, such as the Van Gogh case, for an action or choice to count as character-constituting, 
the individual must be responsible for it. But a choice for which a person can truly be said to 
be responsible must be undertaken voluntarily. Thus for Van Gogh’ s painting to count as 
character-constituting, it must have been undertaken voluntarily. The problem with 
Feinberg’ s argument by analogy is that while the slide from involuntary to non-voluntary is 
useful in some cases -  where responsibility really does seem to be diminished -  in other cases 
it seems premature and potentially dangerous to the identity o f those to whom we apply it. 
The problem is that there are cases -  such as the Van Gogh case -  where we want to attribute 
responsibility for one act that is committed in the same mental state as another act for which 
we do not want to attribute responsibility.
A  severely depressed person is not literally compelled to suicide. She wants to end the pain, 
and she believes that death will end the pain. She is right. That doesn’ t mean this is the best 
choice she could make. There are some cases where it seems very clear that some level o f 
paternalistic interference is warranted and justified -  where, for instance, the depression is to 
a large extent treatable and the patient fails to comprehend this fact. On Feinberg’ s model this 
intervention is justified on the grounds that the depressed person’ s choice to commit suicide 
is non-voluntary. Feinberg makes use o f a metaphorical link between his ‘non-voluntary’ and 
mvoluntary acts. Interference in the latter is clearly not a violation o f self-determination. By 
analogy, interference in the former is likewise justified. But the crucial difference is that 
choices that seem to be non-voluntary (because they are committed in exactly the same 
mental conditions as uncontroversially non-voluntary choices) are real and sometimes 
important choices o f that person -  they can have a bearing on identity in a way that 
involuntary acts cannot. The likeness between involuntary acts and non-voluntary choices 
fails to hold up under analysis, and the step from the justifiability o f interference in 
involuntary acts to the justifiability o f paternalistic interference in non-voluntary choices 
seems to inherit its difficulties.
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2.2 A possible response
There is a fairly standard response to this problem. Feinberg himself outlines one form o f it in 
an early paper, ‘Causing Voluntary Actions’ . If Van Gogh’ s illness causes him to mutilate his 
ear, but also causes him to paint beautiful pictures, the puzzle is how one action can be 
voluntary (as it seems it must be if we are to hold him responsible for it, or praise him), while 
the other is non-voluntary.
Feinberg, it seems, would agree that the action o f painting beautiful pictures is voluntary. But 
the notion o f voluntariness is not quite as strong as might have been supposed. Feinberg’ s 
article is concerned with external human causes -  that is, cases where one person causes 
another to commit some voluntary act. One illuminating and simple example is the following: 
“ I can get an acquaintance to say “ good morning” by putting myself directly in his line o f 
vision, smiling, and saying “ good morning” to him. M y doing these things is not only a 
circumstance but for which his voluntary action would not have occurred, it is also a 
circumstance which, when added to those already present, “made the difference” between his 
speaking and remaining silent” (Feinberg 1970 177). The acquaintance’ s greeting seems to be 
voluntary, by any account, and yet, according to Feinberg, my action is a sufficient cause o f 
it. However, on Feinberg’ s account there are still actions that are non-voluntary because they 
are caused, either by some abnormality within the agent, or by someone or thing outside the 
agent. Failures o f voluntariness can arise through insanity, coercion, ignorance and so on -  all 
these factors can be said to cause the act (1986, 115; chapters 21-26), and when they do so, 
the act fails to be fully voluntary.
What, then, distinguishes voluntary actions from involuntary or incompletely voluntary acts? 
The answer, according to Feinberg, is that an action that is caused by some external source or 
even inner compulsion may yet be voluntary, if it is what the agent would have done anyway. 
He uses the example o f a man attached to a device that moves him according to the direction 
o f the wind. The argument goes that the actions o f this man are not his own; they are rather 
that o f the machine -  he does not move voluntarily. Feinberg’ s response is the following: 
“ The reply to this argument, it seems to me, is that it does make a good deal o f 
difference not into what we are plugged, but rather how we are plugged in. If the 
determining influences are filtered through our own network o f predispositions, 
expectations, purposes, and values, if our own threshold requirements are carefully
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observed, if there is no jarring and abrupt change in the course o f our natural bent, 
then it seems to me to do no violence to common sense for us to claim the act as our 
own, even though its causal initiation be located in the external world. In short, the 
more like an easy triggering o f a natural disposition an external cause is, the less 
difficulty there is in treating its effect as a voluntary action” (1970, 172).
Locke -  makes the point that voluntariness does not entail avoidability: “ it does not follow 
from the description o f an act as voluntary (unconstrained, informed, and deliberate) that an 
agent could have done otherwise” (Feinberg (citing Lehrer) 185). If the shaclded man’ s 
movements accord with his dispositions then they are voluntary, regardless o f the fact that he 
could not have done otherwise.
On this view, the similarity between involuntary and non-voluntary acts need not be merely 
metaphorical. All the actions along the continuum are caused by something internal or 
external to the agent. But voluntary acts fall into a special category because they are in 
accordance with the predispositions, expectations, and so on, o f the agent. As such, it is easy 
to understand why paternalistic interference in acts at the non-voluntary end o f the continuum 
is justified. Since they are not in accordance with the agent’ s dispositions, they need not be 
regarded as expressions o f sovereignty or self-determination.
Harry Frankfurt famously makes the point about voluntary action in ‘Freedom o f the Will and 
the Concept o f a Person’ , where he argues that “The enjoyment o f a free will means the 
satisfaction o f certain desires -  desires o f the second or o f higher orders -  whereas its absence 
means their frustration” (Frankfurt 17). W e are free, according to Frankfurt, when we are free 
to want what we want to want. Frankfurt’ s example o f the unwilling addict can clarify how 
this way o f understanding voluntariness (or freedom) helps to resolve the problems raised in 
the previous section. Recall the Van Gogh example: Van Gogh’ s illness causes him to do two 
things, mutilate his ear and paint beautiful pictures. For the latter we wish to praise him, and 
find it absurd to consider a paternalistic intervention. For the former, however, we are likely 
to excuse him, and if possible paternalistically intervene to prevent the damage.
The unwilling addict has two first-order desires. He wants to take the drug he is addicted to, 
but he also wants to abstain. Frankfurt writes:
“Both desires are his, to be sure; and whether he finally takes the drug or finally 
succeeds in refraining from talcing it, he acts to satisfy what is in a literal sense his
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own desire. In either case he does something he himself wants to do, and he does it 
not because o f some external influence whose aim happens to coincide with his own 
but because o f his desire to do it. The unwilling addict identifies himself, however, 
through the formation o f a second-order volition, with one rather than the other o f 
his conflicting first-order desires. He makes one o f them more truly his own and, in 
so doing, he withdraws himself from the other. It is in virtue o f this identification 
and withdrawal, accomplished through the formation o f a second-order volition, that 
the unwilling addict may meaningfully make the analytically puzzling statements 
that the force moving him to take the drug is a force other than his own, and that it is 
not o f his own free will but rather against his will that this force moves him to take 
it”  (Frankfurt 13).
Similarly, if  Van Gogh identifies himself with his painting -  if he has a second-order desire 
to paint, or if, in Feinberg’ s terms, painting fits his predispositions, expectations, and so on -  
then his painting is free or voluntary. In contrast, if  we assume that he does not have a 
second-order desire to mutilate his own ear, the act is not voluntary: its causation by his 
illness is not tempered by its being in accordance with his second-order desires.
2.3 Freedom and determinism
“The notion that necessity does not inevitably undermine autonomy is familiar and widely 
accepted,” writes Frankfurt. Moreover, “ necessity is not only compatible with autonomy; it is 
in certain respects essential to it. There must be limits to our freedom if we are to have 
sufficient personal reality to exercise genuine autonomy at all. What has no boundaries has 
no shape” (Frankfurt 1988 ix). With this comment Frankfurt aims to bolster the type o f 
response he gives to the problem raised above. But this quote also illustrates that the 
Frankfurt-style response does not merely allow us to evaluatively distinguish between two 
choices made under the same mental conditions. In postulating a notion o f voluntariness that 
is independent o f causal features, Frankfurt also provides a response to the traditional 
problem o f scepticism about free agency. Frankfurt’ s account o f voluntary action is 
compatibilist in arguing that there can be free will regardless o f whether human actions are 
internally or externally caused.
The question o f whether we can be free if determinism is true has been traditionally linked to 
that o f whether we can be morally responsible if determinism is true. This is largely due to
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the common idea that freedom is a necessary condition o f moral responsibility -  so if we are 
not free, we cannot be morally responsible. But our concern with freedom arises from the 
question o f whether paternalistic interference in any action might be justified, rather than 
whether the agents are morally responsible for the action. For these reasons we will focus on 
the question o f free will, rather than that o f moral responsibility.
The puzzle about free will is a familiar one. Free will is argued to be incompatible with 
determinism. (Free will is also argued to be incompatible with indeterminism, though this 
argument will not concern us here -  it is commonly held that even if the world is 
indeterministic at the quantum level, at the level o f human behaviour it is for practical 
purposes deterministic.) A  deterministic system can be characterised as one in which for any 
two propositions Si and S2 expressing the state o f the world at times t\ and t2 respectively, Si 
and the laws o f physics (L) entail S2: (Si & L) —> S2. If determinism is true and we could 
choose between courses o f action (say, if at t2 we could choose to raise one arm rather than 
the other), then by modus tollens we could falsify either the past or laws o f physics.
Assuming that we can’ t falsify the past or the laws o f  physics, we cannot choose between 
courses o f action (Van Inwagen, 47-48).
2.4 The hierarchical response
Frankfurt’ s and Feinberg’ s responses to this puzzle have come to be known as ‘mesh’ 
compatibilist responses. What is required for freedom, on these views, is an appropriate sort 
o f mesh between “ an agent’ s choices or actions and her other actional constituents like 
desires and preferences” (Haji 210). Frankfurt’ s theory, at least, is o f  the hierarchical variety: 
the appropriate mesh is taken to be that between higher order and lower order volitions and 
desires (Haji 210-211). So, as indicated earlier, freedom does not require the Van Inwagen 
condition that we ‘could have done otherwise’ - thereby requiring us to falsify the past or the 
laws o f physics. Freedom consists in the meshing o f one’ s higher- and lower-order volitions.
Haji points that a number o f problems have been raised over the hierarchical models o f 
freedom (212-213). Two o f these are particularly compelling. The first is that, on hierarchical 
models, a person is identified with some set o f her higher order desires or preferences. So, for 
example, the unwilling addict is identified with his second-order preference not to take the 
drug to which he is addicted. This is what enables him coherently to say that he takes the
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drug against his will. But the division o f preferences and desires into first- and higher-order 
seems to be one o f theoretical convenience rather than metaphysical significance. All o f the 
desires and preferences -  whether they be directed at the external world or at other desires 
and preferences -  are equally the desires and preferences o f that person. Agreeing to refer to 
preferences with different directions as being o f different orders, should not permit a sleight 
o f hand that accords preferences o f a higher order a higher status.
The second problem for the hierarchical response to the problem o f free will (or autonomy, as 
we might want to conceive o f it) is one o f regress. On the hierarchical model, a person’ s will 
is free is their second-order desires are effective -  that is, if they are able to want (at the first- 
order) what they want (at the second-order) to want. Effective first-order desires arising from 
compulsions, addictions and so on, that are not validated at the second-order, are then taken 
to be indicators o f an unfree will. But what guarantees that second-order desires are not the 
result o f  compulsions or addictions? Suppose I am told as a child to always be generous. 
Being an earnest type, I confess to my mother each time I act ungenerously, and she 
withholds my dessert. I am effectively conditioned to want (at the second-order) to want (at 
the first order) to give to others. It seems that Frankfurt must say that this second-order 
preference o f mine can be an expression o f free agency, provided it is validated at the third 
order. I must prefer to have been conditioned in such a way as to always want to want to give 
to others.
However, the problem can be raised at any order o f the agent’ s preferences. Couldn’ t my 
third-order desire to want to want to want to give to others, be as alien to me as the unwilling 
addict’ s first-order desire to take the drug? Frankfurt’ s response is this:
“ It is possible to terminate such a series o f acts [of identification at higher and 
higher orders] without cutting it o ff arbitrarily. When a person identifies himself 
decisively with one o f his first-order desires, this commitment “ resounds” 
throughout the potentially endless array o f higher orders. Consider a person who, 
without reservation or conflict, wants to be motivated by the desire to concentrate on 
his work. The fact that his second-order volition to be moved by this desire is a 
decisive one means that there is no room for questions concerning the pertinence of 
desires or volitions o f higher orders.... The decisiveness o f the commitment he has 
made means that he has decided that no further question about his second-order 
volition, at any higher order, remains to be asked” (Frankfurt 1971, 16).
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At this point we may feel the value objection lack in again -  why does a certain level o f 
preference provide the decisive indicator o f a person’ s wants? Why does identification at one 
level trump identification at another level? And how realistic is it to put forward a theory 
which attempts to impose a rigid hierarchical structure on the grasshopper thoughts that make 
up most human minds? This last objection seems to me most telling against Frankfurt’ s 
hierarchical model: it fails on simple credibility.
2.5 Gathering threads
The problem we had was how to distinguish voluntary from non-voluntary actions, given the 
problems o f scepticism about free will and the difficulty o f distinguishing between two 
choices made under apparently the same mental conditions. The worry is that if anything is 
non-voluntary, everything is: all our actions and ‘choices’ (not just those o f the addict or the 
person swept down the river) are determined by factors beyond our control. Feinberg hints at 
a response to these problems in ‘Causing Voluntary Action’ . It is clear that he believes that 
not all action is non-voluntary, and that even caused action can be voluntary in the relevant 
sense. The relevant sense for us is that there must be some actions that can be assessed as 
voluntary enough to be immune from paternalistic interference.
O f course this is not a problem that only arises on Feinberg’ s model. Wherever autonomy or 
self-determination, or freedom, or sovereignty is touted as a value, the metaphysical problem 
o f freedom o f the will becomes an issue. Why make such a fuss about the right to self­
determination, if we are deluded that we are self-determining in the first place? But 
Feinberg’ s analysis o f when paternalism is justified and when it is not, seems particularly 
prone to the problem. Because Feinberg uses a comparison with involuntary action to explain 
why it is justifiable to interfere in rcozz-voluntary action, other features o f involuntary action 
are naturally assimilated into non-voluntary action. Non-voluntary action is naturally taken to 
be no more o f an expression o f free agency than is involuntary action. But non-voluntary 
action is on a continuum with voluntary action (as Feinberg readily admits). Factors such as 
ignorance and internal compulsion come in degrees, and sufficiently voluntary is therefore 
only a short step from substantially non-voluntary.
Feinberg’ s comments in ‘Causing Voluntary Action’ could be understood as advocating the 
sort o f hierarchical model o f the free will that Harry Frankfurt supports. On Frankfurt’ s
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model, a choice would be voluntary when there is a decisive commitment to it at a higher 
order o f preference. Non-voluntary choices are still choices o f that person, but we can make 
sense o f why someone might say that their choice was alien to them, why they acted against 
their will. W e can make sense o f the comparison Feinberg makes between involuntary and 
non-voluntary choices. Because non-voluntary choices are not themselves chosen, non­
voluntary choices are importantly like being swept down a river. On this model, the 
similarity might be strong enough to ground the moral distinction that Feinberg makes -  that 
interference in non-voluntary choices is justified, where interference in voluntary choices is 
not.
But we have seen that there are major problems with this view o f the distinction between 
voluntary and non-voluntary choices. There is no real distinction between desires and 
preferences o f a lower order, and those o f a higher order. Moreover, we encounter a regress 
problem when we try to decide which level o f the person’ s will makes the final decision 
about what they want and who they are. Finally, Frankfurt’ s model is structurally dubious.
2.6 An alternative explanation of voluntariness
Feinberg’ s analysis o f justified and unjustified paternalism needs some sort o f  compatibilist 
underpinning, to explain why not every action is not non-voluntary. But the hierarchical 
model is not the only available alternative. One other compelling response to the problem of 
how any action can be free, is Daniel Dennett's compatibilism.
Dennett’ s compatibilism is based on a thoroughgoing naturalistic perspective. His argument 
turns on the complexity o f evolved life -  human life in particular -  and the way this 
complexity demands conceptualisation at more than one level. At the physical level, events 
may indeed be determined, such that “ there is at any instant exactly one physically possible 
future” (Van Inwagen quoted in Dennett 2003, 25). But the physical level is not the only one 
at which we can conceptualise life or events. In our world, there is also the design level. The 
(probably deterministic) processes o f evolution in our world have created over time entities 
that can be thought o f as if they were designed by the hand o f evolution. The design level 
“ has its own language, a transparent foreshortening o f the tedious descriptions one could give 
at the physical lev er  (Dennett 2003, 39). The ontology o f the design level, as Dennett points 
out, will be significantly different from the ontology o f the physical level. At the most basic
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physical level entities can clearly be seen to obey the laws o f the deterministic universe. But 
as more basic elements are added and the corpus o f laws expanded, “ simple entities can 
evolve that are capable o f avoiding harm and reproducing themselves” (22).
This evolution o f complexity can be illustrated in simple software toys such as the game 
‘Life’ , in which complex, apparently designed systems evolve from very basic components 
with only two possible states, and simple deterministic laws. ‘Life’ at the design level 
suddenly starts to appear purposeful: clusters o f elements ‘glide’ across the screen, or ‘eat’ 
each other in order to ‘survive’ . In Dennett’ s view our actual, physical world is analogous to 
the ‘L ife’ world. Though the basic physical elements are indeed basic, unintelligent and 
governed by deterministic laws, the sheer number o f basic elements and deterministic laws 
creates an overwhelming complexity that demands conceptualisation at more than one level.
Dennett argues that the concept o f inevitability -  traditionally linked to determinism -  
properly “belongs at the design level, not the physical level.”  (22) The concept o f 
inevitability is grounded in that o f evitability, the possibility o f avoidance. Without the 
possibility o f avoidance -  o f harm, for instance -  we could never grasp the impossibility o f 
avoidance that is inevitability. But it is at the design level that there is action rather than mere 
occurrence. (43) In our complex world, some creatures have been ‘designed’ to be able to 
avoid harm. Since some harms are avoidable by creatures at the design level, some harms are 
evitable. Evitability and its dependent opposite, inevitability, are evolved concepts o f the 
design level. Not everything at the design level is inevitable, and so the traditional slip from 
determinism to inevitability is blocked. In Dennett’ s view, it is a failure to appreciate the 
complexity o f the natural, evolved world, including the personal and cultural worlds o f 
humans, that has given us the mistaken belief that some o f our concepts must clash.
Dennett argues that “Determinism doesn’ t imply that whatever we do, we could not have 
done otherwise” (95). This misconception about determinism arises from a misunderstanding 
o f the concept o f possibility. Dennett casts the concepts o f necessity, possibility and 
causation in terms o f possible worlds. A necessity is true in all possible worlds, and, 
according to Dennett, a possibility is whatever is not necessarily not the case. But when we 
canvass the possible worlds to determine whether something is necessary or possible, we can 
restrict the scope o f our search more or less, depending on the context (66-67). In particular, 
when we assess counterfactual claims such as ‘If you had tripped Arthur, he would have
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fallen’ , we pick out a set o f worlds substantially similar to our own in which you tripped 
Arthur, and see whether he fell in all, some, or none o f them.
To simplify Dennett’ s position, consider some action and its consequence in this world - 1 
struck a key, and a letter appeared on my monitor. Could it have been the case that the letter 
did not appear? From the perspective o f this world, at the instant I hit the key, there is only 
one physically possible world, given determinism. (This is the definition o f determinism.)
But, had the world been ever so slightly different up to that point (and it might well have 
been) there is no confusion in saying that the letter need not have appeared. It is this 
variability in the scope o f what we take as the basis for deciding what could have been, that 
leads to confusion about whether we could have done otherwise (70; 75-77): “ the truth or 
falsity o f determinism should not affect our belief that certain unrealized events were 
nevertheless “possible” , in an important everyday sense o f the word” (77).
To some, this may seem like cold comfort -  certainly, I could have done otherwise, but only 
if I lived in an entirely different possible world! This intractably sceptical position would say 
that it is what is physically possible that concerns us in these cases: it is important that we 
could not, physically, have done otherwise. But let’ s grant Dennett his construal o f possibility 
for the moment and see how he believes freedom evolves.
Dennett sees freedom as a human construction, like music or romantic love -  but like music 
and love, the reality o f freedom cannot long be denied. Though Dennett’ s analysis requires 
greater conceptual tinkering that Frankfurt’ s -  o f  our concepts o f possibility and inevitability, 
for instance -  it is still a compatibilist response to the problem o f freedom given determinism. 
We are free when we could have done otherwise, with the ‘could’ opening up a class o f 
actions that are consistent with our ‘design’ , rather than a class o f physical possibility (since 
our actual world is the only physically possible one, given some previous state and 
deterministic laws). Unlike Frankfurt’ s model, Dennett’ s is based in a realistic and complex 
picture o f the human mind.
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2.7 The nagging doubt
If freedom is a human creation like music or love, then it is subject to human destruction. 
Dennett argues that his variety o f freedom -  based on scientific understanding o f the 
processes o f evolution rather than “ false myths about human nature” (Dennett 2003, 287) is 
both more worth defending and more robust than older conceptions o f freedom.
But there is a question o f ‘creeping exculpation’ .
“W e now uncontroversially exculpate or mitigate in many cases that our ancestors 
would have dealt with much more harshly. Is this progress or are we all going soft 
on sin? To the fearful, this revision looks like erosion, and to the hopeful it looks 
like growing enlightenment, but there is also a neutral perspective from which to 
view the process. It looks to an evolutionist like a rolling equilibrium, never quiet 
for long, the relatively stable outcome o f a series o f innovations and counter­
innovations, adjustments and meta-adjustments, an arms race that generates at least 
one sort o f progress: growing self-knowledge, growing sophistication about who we 
are and what we are, and what we can and cannot do. And from this self­
understanding, we fashion and re-fashion our conclusions about what we ought to 
do” (Dennett 2003, 290).
W e should not be frightened o f the impact o f a greater understanding o f our place in the 
natural world, according to Dennett. Rather, we should explore these implications to the full 
and decide what we are to do about them.
Dennett’ s view is that our institutions o f moral praise and blame should not be swept aside by 
this new understanding -  this is unsurprising given he has a picture o f the evolutionary 
importance o f these institutions. (Though o f course some features o f human anatomy and 
society that were once very useful are no longer so.) But, to use one o f Dennett’ s 
catchphrases, “ If you make yourself really small, you can externalize virtually everything.” If 
I understand myself as a product o f the shaping forces o f evolution, and my genetic code, and 
my upbringing, then it seems I need no longer take responsibility for my actions.
Dennett’ s response to this problem involves what he sees as a shift in our thinking about the 
ethical and the metaphysical.
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“The key shift in perspective that will enable this is an inversion described by 
Stephen White in The Unity o f  the S e l f [ . Don’ t try to use metaphysics to ground 
ethics, he argues; put it the other way around: Use ethics to fix what we should mean 
by our “ metaphysical”  criterion. First, show how there can be an internal 
justification for some agent acquiescing in his own punishment -  saying, in effect, 
“Thanks, I needed that!” -  and then use that understanding to anchor and support a 
reading o f our pivotal phrase, could have done otherwise'. “An agent could have 
done other than he or she did just in case the ascription o f responsibility and blame 
to that agent for the action in question is justified” (p.236). In other words, the fact 
that free will is worth wanting can be used to anchor our conception o f free will in a 
way metaphysical myths fail to do” (Dennett 2003, 297).
What could possibly make someone acquiesce in her own punishment? According to 
Dennett, it is that she values being treated as a free agent in other contexts. “ Since there will 
always be strong temptations to make yourself really small, to externalize the causes o f your 
actions and deny responsibility, the way to counteract these is to make people an offer they 
can’ t refuse: If you want to be free, you must take responsibility”  (292).
This point was already mentioned in the context o f the Van Gogh problem: freedom was seen 
to be necessary for identity, because freedom is required for responsibility, and responsibility 
for identity. But the Van Gogh problem can be raised again here to make a different point. A 
possible problem for Dennett is that many people will want to be treated as autonomous 
agents in situations where it is to their advantage but not otherwise. The ascription o f blame 
will not be justified unless the person acquiesces fo r  that action.
The Van Gogh example shows that it is important to distinguish between acts made under 
similar mental conditions, to allow that responsibility can be held for the one but not the 
other. But given this possibility, it seems that in the context o f moral responsibility we might 
pick and choose what actions we want to be held responsible for. Perhaps Dennett can 
address this problem by giving special consideration to the chronically mentally ill. Or maybe 
there are simply fewer difficulties in granting general responsibility than moral responsibility. 
We will leave these problems o f the practical stance for the moment, to bring the discussion 
back to paternalism. .
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2.8 The flip side: creeping paternalism
Dennett admits that we are likely to exculpate in more and more cases, given a greater 
understanding o f the mind. But this allowance o f diminished responsibility in a broader range 
o f cases invites a ‘creeping paternalism’ as well: in cases where responsibility may 
legitimately be denied by the agent, paternalistic intervention becomes a live option. But to 
deny responsibility is to deny the self -  and who wants to do that? Thus what holds the line 
against creeping exculpation should also hold the line against a creeping paternalism -  if  the 
practical stance is workable at all.
How is this not like the compatibilist solutions o f old? Well, it makes explicit what was 
already there -  that w e’re basing the idea o f freedom on our moral intuitions rather than the 
other way around. Whether this is legitimate can be put to a practical test, and at least is an 
idea worth exploring.
2.9 Conclusion
W e started this chapter with the question o f whether Feinberg’ s distinction between voluntary 
and non-voluntary choices can do the work that he wants it to do in his theory o f justified 
versus unjustified paternalism. What we think o f as non-voluntary choices -  those made 
when we are under mental pressure, or irrationality, or significant ignorance -  are 
traditionally linked by metaphor to completely involuntary actions to which the concept o f 
choice does not apply at all. Feinberg makes use o f this metaphorical linkage to argue that 
non-voluntary choices, like involuntary actions, are not properly thought o f as expressions of 
self-determination or sovereignty.
But the link is only metaphorical. Non-voluntary choices and involuntary actions are more 
dissimilar than they are alike. In particular, whether an act is held to be non-voluntary or 
voluntary depends at least in part on how it is viewed by the person who makes it, and those 
who observe it or talk about it. Involuntariness (though not entirely clear-cut) seems to be 
more objective. The standard solution to this problem has been a hierarchical model o f  an 
individual’ s choices, such as that proposed by Harry Frankfurt. On this model, the voluntary 
choice is the one that is chosen, while the involuntary choice is the one the individual would 
prefer not to make. This is how we are to make sense o f how non-voluntary choices are
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importantly like involuntary actions. Because people would rather not make certain choices, 
these can be seen as somehow external to them.
But apart from the nagging sceptical worry, there are problems with Frankfurt’ s view, the 
most serious o f which are that it requires an unrealistic division o f the self into levels o f 
choice, and places unwarranted value on the ‘higher’ levels. Identity does not reside at one or 
the other level o f preference in the human mind, though consciousness may play a large part 
in stringing it all together for us. Identification, therefore, cannot occur at any single level.
Dennett’ s compatibilism is based on a complex and thoroughgoing naturalism. Which 
choices are made freely -  when we coidd have done otherwise -  will be something we figure 
out on the basis o f  the overall responsibility we want to take, on the size o f self we want. 
Thus freedom becomes dependent on our practises o f responsibility-attribution. And since 
paternalistic action and law are instances o f responsibility-attribution, the freedom we 
attribute to individuals will depend partly on our practices o f paternalism.
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Chapter 3
3.0 Introduction
It is a presumption o f the law, medicine and liberal theory (including M ill’ s On Liberty) that 
there are cases where we are completely justified in acting paternalistically, as we have 
defined paternalism above. That is, we are justified in usurping some choices for the purpose 
o f promoting the good o f the person concerned. The easiest cases o f where paternalism seems 
justified are those o f self-harming choices made by children and people suffering from 
dementia and other debilitating mental illnesses. Feinberg attempted to ground this ‘soft’ 
paternalism by arguing that it does not violate the fundamental right o f sovereignty because 
(along with choices made from physical pressure and coercion) the choices are non­
voluntary. But when we asked exactly what distinguished voluntary choices from the non­
voluntary, we came across some difficulties. At the practical level, the Van Gogh problem 
illustrates the difficulty o f distinguishing between voluntary and non-voluntary choices made 
by the same person in the same state. Then there is the underlying metaphysical problem of 
whether there can be voluntary choices at all.
In this chapter I begin to explore Dennett’ s idea that metaphysical freedom be based on actual 
ascriptions o f responsibility. Dennett argues that what is classed as a voluntary action should 
be based on what, in practise, we take and are given responsibility for. In the practical context 
o f paternalism, such ascriptions o f responsibility are made through determinations of 
competence in medicine, either for application in medicine or for legal reasons. A  person is 
deemed responsible for a criminal action, to take the relevant example, only if she is deemed 
a competent decision-maker. Thus the competence determinations common in medical 
practise and law will set o ff a class o f voluntary actions from those that are non-voluntary. 
The incompetent person is denied responsibility for her choices. These choices will therefore 
be classed as non-voluntary, and may be paternalistically usurped, according to Feinberg’ s 
model.
37
3.1 Competence
The standard practical view on paternalism is that we are at least justified in denying choices 
made by the incompetent person. The Millian intuitions about when paternalism is legitimate 
-  in cases o f derangement, ignorance, childhood, and so on -  are formalised in practical 
guidelines for determinations o f competence. They are subsequently enforced through law 
that takes competence as setting the boundary o f criminal responsibility. In Deciding fo r  
Others, Allen Buchanan and Dan Brock set out detailed guidelines for determining the 
competence o f individuals to make decisions for themselves. Their guidelines constitute the 
practical side o f the equation that Dennett wants to balance.
Incompetence, Buchanan and Brock argue, is decision-relative -  that is, a person may be 
competent to make one decision but not another. Or a person’ s competence for a particular 
decision may be affected by her surroundings, by who explains the alternatives to her, by the 
current state o f her illness, and so on. For these reasons it is not possible to make an overall, 
one-off assessment o f a person’ s decision-making competence (Buchanan and Brock (B&B) 
18-20). It is the decision-relativity o f competence determinations that is thought to solve 
problems like the Van Gogh problem. For if competence is a function o f particular decisions 
rather than simply the mental state o f the individual concerned, Van Gogh can be held 
competent to paint but not to self-mutilate.
Buchanan and Brock distinguish three crucial elements o f decision-making competence. The 
competent person
1)can understand and communicate,
2)can reason and deliberate and
3)has a set o f values or a conception o f the good.
Understanding and the capacity to communicate are required for the person to be adequately 
informed as to what alternatives they have, and to express their eventual choice. Interestingly, 
Buchanan and Brock set quite a high standard for understanding:
“ Understanding is not a merely formal or abstract process, but also requires the 
ability to appreciate the nature and meaning o f potential alternatives -  what it would 
be like and “ feel” like to be in possible future states and to undergo vaiious 
experiences -  and to integrate this appreciation into one’ s decision making” (B&B 
24).
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The criterion o f being able to understand the impact o f one’ s decisions is another reason why 
competence will be decision-relative. For instance, a child might be allowed to decide what 
sweet she wants, since she has the capacity to understand the possible consequences o f this 
decision (eating what she would like to eat, not eating something she doesn’ t want), but not 
allowed to eat sweets all the time, since she can’ t fully comprehend the long-term 
possibilities that hinge on her decision.
The second criterion -  the capacity for reasoning and deliberation -  is required so that the 
process o f decision-making can take place. “Reasoning and deliberation require capacities to 
draw inferences about the consequences o f making a certain choice and to compare 
alternative outcomes based on how they further one’ s good or promote one’ s ends” (25). 
Reasoning and deliberation seem to be the calculative component o f choice, where 
understanding is the ability to put oneself in the position o f having made the choice, and 
seeing how one would feel. And finally, the competent decision maker must have a 
conception o f the good or set o f values by which to judge the various outcomes open to her, 
and this conception must be “ at least minimally consistent, stable, and affirmed as his or her 
own” (25).
Buchanan and Brock stress that decision-making competence is a threshold concept, not a 
comparative one: “ in the legal process in particular, it is important to resist the notion that 
persons can be determined to be more or less competent, or competent to some degree, to 
make a particular decision... [The function o f the determination o f competence is] first and 
foremost, to sort persons into two classes: (1) those whose voluntary decisions (about their 
health care, financial affairs, and so on) must be respected by others and accepted as binding, 
and (2) those whose decisions, even if uncoerced, will be set aside and for whom others will 
act as surrogate decision-makers” (B&B 27). (By 'voluntary' Buchanan and Brock simply 
mean unforced and uncoerced.) Determinations o f responsibility for medicine and law need 
to be clear cut. Competence, therefore, cannot be held by degrees.
However, all o f  the components o f competence may be held by degrees. Understanding and 
communication can be impaired to a greater or lesser extent. A  person learning about her 
medical condition in a language not native to her has some difficulty in understanding and 
communicating, while the unconscious patient has no ability to understand or communicate at 
all. Reasoning and deliberation abilities are even more variable and difficult to assess -
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human intelligence is an active area o f research in which the only certainty is that there are no 
clear boundaries. Finally, the set o f values on which decisions are to be based may be more or 
less coherent and well-defined. It is therefore clear that the overall determination o f 
competence is based on some kind o f (implicitly or explicitly) stipulated threshold: no 
boundary o f competence exists in nature.
3.2 Setting standards of competence
Buchanan and Brock differ from Feinberg in arguing that there is a positive case for 
paternalism. They agree that respect for a person’ s self-determination is one o f the most 
important values at stake, but the paternalist is positively justified because her action 
promotes and protects the good o f the individual whose choices are usurped. For Buchanan 
and Brock, self-determination and a person’ s good can conflict, and the two must be 
balanced: self-determination is not overriding. If a patient is judged incompetent to make a 
particular decision then her self-determination may be sacrificed in favour o f her good. But 
the decision as to whether a patient’ s self-determination may be sacrificed to further her other 
interests will depend on features o f the particular situation. “There is no uniquely “correct” 
answer to the relative weight that should be assigned to these two values, and in any event it 
is simply a fact that different persons do assign them significantly different weight” (B&B 
41).
In practise, what this means is that the threshold level o f  competence is stipulated in response 
to a relative assignment o f value to the self-determination and overall good o f the person 
concerned. If self-determination is found to be weightier in one context, then the threshold 
level o f competence may be set lower. But if the person’ s good is taken to have more value, 
the threshold o f competence may be set higher, and therefore be more difficult to meet. It is 
more likely in this situation that paternalistic interference will be warranted.
In what situations might a person be judged incompetent on the basis o f an assessment o f 
these values rather than an objective analysis o f their mental state according to the criteria 
outlined above? In borderline cases, factors such as the riskiness o f the decision come into 
play. If a person whose competence is questionable wants to do something that will have a 
seriously negative impact on their well-being, either in the short or long term, then concern
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for her good might outweigh concern for her well-being, and she will be judged incompetent 
on this basis.
Here we can see clearly that this theory operates at the practical rather than the normative 
theoretical or metaphysical level. For unless they are willing to defend an ethical 
particularism (and Buchanan and Brock do not indicate that this is their aim), philosophers 
will want to assign reasonably definitive relative weights to the values, and will not be overly 
concerned by the fact that people do assign them different weights in different circumstances. 
The practical inconsistency o f humans need not be incorporated into a theory o f the virtues. 
This fact about how people actually weigh self-determination and the overall good seems 
likely to lead to confusion in this context anyway, since it creates an ambiguity about whether 
we should take the patient’ s or the doctor’ s assignment o f value as conclusive. What is 
important for the moment, though, is that Buchanan and Brock take the two values o f self­
determination and the good o f the person to require balancing before a judgement o f whether 
paternalism is warranted can be made.
In fact, Buchanan and Brock argue that Feinberg’ s attempt to rest his theory o f justified 
paternalism on the single value o f sovereignty is incoherent. W e have seen that for Feinberg, 
where self-fulfillment and sovereignty conflict, sovereignty always dominates (remember that 
non-voluntary choices are not expressions o f sovereignty). “Feinberg rejects perfect 
voluntariness as an impossibly high standard, so the question is how voluntary is “ truly 
voluntary” or voluntary enough to be protected from paternalistic interferences.. .Feinberg 
offers some rules o f thumb for determining the appropriate level o f voluntariness, two of 
which are that the more risky the conduct, and the more irreversible the risked harm, the 
greater the degree o f voluntariness that should be required if the conduct is to be permitted” 
(B&B 43-44). But Buchanan and Brock argue that Feinberg’ s voluntariness assessment 
involves a trade-off between self-determination and the person’ s good. The fact that the 
degree o f potential harm and the riskiness o f the venture make some input into the 
determination o f voluntariness, on Feinberg’ s model, indicates that self-determination is not 
the only value at stake. By introducing these factors Feinberg is effectively doing exactly 
what Buchanan and Brock do: weighing the potential damage to the person’ s interests against 
their right to be self-determining.
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Thus Buchanan and Brock see little conflict between their own view and Feinberg’ s -  both 
balance self-determination and the individual’ s good in the crucial determinations o f which 
choices should be allowed to be earned through without intervention. The more stringently 
we set standards o f competence (or voluntariness) the more we opt for promoting the 
person’ s good at the expense o f self-determination. The lower our standard o f competence, 
the more our concern for respecting self-determination at the risk o f damaging overall 
interests.
Buchanan and Brock write:
“The proper standard o f competence must be chosen; it cannot be discovered. There 
is no reason to believe that there is one and only one optimal trade-off between the 
competing values o f well-being and self-determination, nor, hence, any one uniquely 
correct level o f capacity at which to set the threshold o f competence -  even for a 
particular decision under specified circumstances. In this sense, setting a standard 
for competence is a value choice, not solely a scientific or factual matter” (B&B 47).
According to Buchanan and Brock’ s model, Van Gogh’ s two decisions can be distinguished 
by their riskiness. When he wished to paint, Van Gogh’ s decision does not pose any threat to 
his future well-being -  thus he can safely be judged competent to paint. But when he wants to 
self-mutilate, we might take his good to outweigh his self-determination, and judge him 
incompetent to make the decision. The threshold for competence becomes more stringent as 
the desired behaviour becomes riskier.
One might legitimately wonder how we got from the threefold, reasonably objective criteria 
for determining competence to the claim that competence (and voluntariness, by Buchanan 
and Brock’ s argument) is a value judgement. For the threefold criteria it would seem that 
competence is a judgement that can be made purely by psychological assessment o f the 
patient, rather than any weighing o f values. But on Buchanan and Brock’ s model, 
competence ends up having little to do with mental capacities and more to do with the 
evaluation o f the decision made by those who are in the position to set the threshold for 
competence.
But the idea that a person’ s competence can be judged in terms o f relative valuations o f her 
good and her self-determination is absurd: her competence is a feature emergent on her 
mental capacities, not on the weighing o f values by some outside observer. The riskiness o f
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the Van Gogh’ s choice has nothing constitutive to do with his mental competence (though it 
might be taken as evidence for a mental problem). If the riskiness o f decisions were taken as 
the deciding factor in determining incompetence, most o f the world would be uninhabited and 
space unexplored, as well as countless scientific discoveries unmade. The fact is that 
reasonable people can calculate that an extremely dangerous activity is worth the risk to 
them, though others may be unable to comprehend the potential benefits.
The problem for Buchanan and Brock’ s theory arose when we came to the point o f 
stipulating a threshold o f competence. For, as we saw, all the elements o f competence can be 
held by degree, and there seems to be no natural way o f separating the competent from the 
incompetent individual. However, this does not mean the competence judgement must 
become a value judgement. There are legitimate ways o f stipulating a threshold of 
competence that do not require weighing self-determination against the person’ s good in the 
first instance.
The Van Gogh problem has an alternative solution to that mentioned above. Though 
competence determinations need not be directly risk-related, they can be risk-related in an 
indirect manner: it may take more mental capacity to comprehend the consequences o f a risky 
decision than a safe one. W e saw that a child might be competent to decide what to eat for a 
particular dessert but not to eat sweets for every meal, because she can comprehend the 
possible outcomes in one decision-making situation but not the other. Likewise, Van Gogh 
may be competent to make the decision to paint because the outcomes o f painting are less 
complex and require less mental capacity to comprehend than the outcomes o f self­
mutilation. If Van Gogh does not have the capacity to understand the outcome o f self­
mutilation -  what it will be like to be mutilated -  then he may be judged incompetent to make 
the decision to self-mutilate.
3.3 The story so far
Joel Feinberg sets out the limits o f justified paternalism in terms o f voluntary and non­
voluntary action. Paternalism is justified when the choices at stake are substantially non­
voluntary, because those choices are not to be regraded as expressions o f sovereignty. 
Feinberg’ s account, like other ethical theories at the applied level, rests on a distinction 
between classes o f actions that seems eventually to require an answer to the problem o f
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whether any actions can be free at all. Daniel Dennett argues that many o f our actions are 
freely chosen in a strong sense, but that we are looking for the basis o f that freedom from the 
wrong perspective. Rather than trying to ground the ethical on the metaphysical, we should 
be using our ethical practises to ground our metaphysics. What we take and are given 
responsibility for, according to Dennett, is what we do voluntarily.
One class o f actions that we are not given responsibility for, are those done when we are 
judged to be incompetent as decision-makers. Young children are not held to be responsible 
for many decisions because they do not have sufficient experience or reasoning ability to be 
able to comprehend the consequences o f their actions. The same goes for psychotic and senile 
individuals. Since, in the practical context, responsibility is withheld from these individuals, 
it follows (on Dennett’ s model) that their actions are not undertaken voluntarily. What counts 
as incompetence? Buchanan and Brock set out the requirements for competence in terms o f 
mental capacities. But mental capacities come by degrees, while competence judgements are 
either positive or negative. Therefore a threshold for competence must be stipulated.
3.4 Begging the question in competence judgements
Buchanan and Brock argue that the threshold for decision-making competence should be 
made by referral to the values o f self-determination and the overall good o f the individual 
whose competence is in question. But if these are the deciding factors in competence 
judgements, why bother with independent tests o f  mental capacities at all? W hy not just 
decide whether we value their self-determination or their overall good more highly, and let 
that be the decider o f their competence: they are incompetent when we want to help them 
against their wishes and competent otherwise?
To put the point more precisely, when we are making a decision about someone’ s decision­
making competence, we are trying to determine whether it is legitimate or not to interfere in 
their choices. Using our evaluation o f their self-determination versus their overall good as the 
basis for deciding whether they are competent or not, thus begs the question as to whether it 
is legitimate to interfere in their choices. Our competence determination is supposed to be the 
decider, but we have already decided when we weigh overall good more heavily than self­
determination, and set the competence threshold too high for that individual to meet.
Begging the question o f the legitimacy o f interference in competence determinations can 
clearly lead to violations o f the right to self-determination -  in effect, it lets hard paternalism 
in through the back door. If competence -  and therefore voluntariness -  is decided by 
reference to the evaluator’ s judgement o f the respective value o f self-determination in this 
particular case, the evaluator is free to rank self-determination below overall good whenever 
the choice in question is not one they support. This is particularly problematic when the 
desired behaviour is extremely risky or damaging. As I argued earlier, the fact that a choice is 
risky has nothing to do with whether a person is competent to make the choice, except insofar 
as greater mental capacities may be required to assess the possible outcomes o f the choice. 
Standards o f competence should not be automatically higher for risky choices. But if  the 
threshold for competence is set with respect to a valuation o f a person’ s good, it will turn out 
to be risk-related in just this way: it will be legitimate to stop people with the mental 
capacities o f a reasonable adult from undertaking extremely risky actions. This point will 
become clearer as we explore a case o f possible paternalism in the law.
But let us quickly look at how this relates back to the practical stance on the metaphysical 
problem o f voluntariness advocated by Dennett. Recall that, according to Dennett, the class 
o f voluntary actions should be delineated by what we take and are given responsibility for in 
practical situations. In law and medicine, judgements o f incompetence separate a class o f 
decisions that we are not held responsible for, from the rest. Decisions made when we are 
incompetent may be paternalistically usurped, and nor are we blamed for them by the law.
The actions resulting from decisions made by incompetents, then, will be a class o f non­
voluntary actions, effectively unfree.
But Dennett’ s practical stance conflicts with the risk-related model o f  incompetence o f 
Buchanan and Brock. Firstly, the riskiness o f a choice seems to have no more to do with 
freedom than it does with mental capability. It does not seem that we become less free the 
greater the danger o f the activity we wish to undertake. The reasonable adult skydiver is no 
less free than the reasonable adult bookworm. But on Buchanan and Brock’ s model we would 
get precisely this result. Since we are more likely to be judged incompetent when the choice 
is a risky one, we are given less responsibility for risky choices and are therefore less free 
when we make them.
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3.5 Competence in the legal context
In the current law, consent is immateiial when an act occasions harm beyond a certain level. 
This was demonstrated in the case o f R v Brown, in which five men were convicted o f assault 
occasioning actual bodily harm and unlawful wounding on the basis o f  their participation in 
entirely consensual sadomasochistic activities. Though no complaints were made to the 
police, and the Crown’ s case was made on the evidence o f video tapes members o f the group 
had made, the conviction was upheld in the House o f Lords. There were a number o f strands 
o f argument in the Lords’ response to the appeal (including arguments from the immorality o f 
the acts), but one at least was paternalistic: that persons simply should not be allowed to 
consent to harm beyond the level o f  ‘transient and trifling’ (.R v Brown 75; 77-79; 88; 94).
There is a general principle in law that consensual acts are allowable. The restriction on this 
principle imposed by the House o f  Lords in the case mentioned above does turn out to be (at 
least partly) paternalistic, on the definition o f legal paternalism with which this thesis began. 
In the next sections I explore another potential application o f this restriction: cases o f persons 
who wish to contract to have healthy limbs amputated. I start by determining whether the law 
against contracting to have such a harm performed upon one is paternalistic in the 
presumptively justified or unjustified sense, in terms o f competence. On the practical model 
o f competence, paternalism is presumptively justified when the person in question is 
incompetent as a decision-maker, and presumptively unjustified otherwise. I briefly rehearse 
the argument that it is not a sufficient justification for legal sanctions that they protect the 
good o f competent individuals at the expense o f their self-determination. If it is interpreted as 
an instance o f presumptively justified paternalism, we must read this law as the claim that 
persons who wish to have a certain degree o f harm inflicted upon them are to be presumed 
incompetent to make that decision.
The case o f apotemnophilia -  the desire to have a healthy limb amputated -  may tempt us 
towards this view. W e need not hold that the desire for such harm is constitutive of 
incompetence, merely that it is overwhelming evidence for incompetence. The law in effect 
stipulates a threshold for incompetence based on strongly valuing the good o f those it affects 
over their self-determination in this regard. Those who wish to have harm beyond a certain 
level inflicted upon them, are deemed incompetent to make the decision on the basis o f a 
stipulated threshold o f competence that is higher than they can meet. But even in the case o f
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the desire to have a healthy limb amputated, this stipulation o f incompetence can be called 
into question. The case will illustrate the problem o f using evaluations o f the weight o f self­
determination in a decision about competence. This problem will occur even if the 
individuals are assessed one by one rather than covered by the same law banning consent to 
serious harm.
W e turn next to a general investigation o f the proper response for the law to take in cases 
where the competence o f decision-makers is questionable. As argued earlier, valuing the 
patient’ s good over their self-determination in stipulations o f incompetence seems to be 
letting hard paternalism in the back door. To understand how to deal with cases o f 
questionable competence we need first to understand the grounds for opposing paternalism 
involving competent individuals. This task turns out to present a number o f  philosophical 
challenges.
3.6 Apotemnophilia
In January 2000 the British press began to make much o f the phenomenon o f apotemnophilia. 
Dr Robert Smith, a surgeon at Falkirk and District Royal Infirmary in Scotland, had 
performed two amputations o f healthy legs at the request o f the patients, and with the support 
o f the hospital’ s medical director and its chief executive. The patients were each assessed by 
two psychiatrists and a psychologist prior to surgery; they paid for the operations themselves, 
and Smith waived his personal fee. Both patients said they, were very satisfied with the results 
o f the amputations.
These newsworthy and somewhat sanitised cases o f apotemnophilia are just the tip o f the 
iceberg. In May 1998 a 79 year old man died o f gangrene in a hotel room in Mexico, two 
days after a botched operation to remove his healthy left leg. The operation was performed by 
an ex-doctor who had been charged with incompetence and had his license revoked in 1977. 
In October 1999 a Milwaukee man severed his own arm with a home-made guillotine and 
threatened to sue the hospital and re-amputate his arm if it was reattached. On the premise 
that amputation can’ t be ethically denied if an injury would cause death without it, the 
website http://www.ampulove.com / contains self-mutilation tips for ‘wannabes’ and 
gruesome photos o f home surgery success stories.
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John Hopkins psychologist John Money coined the term ‘apotemnophilia’ in 1977 (Elliott 
2000) The suffix ‘ -philia’ might seem to place it in the category o f sexual paraphilias, but it is 
not at all clear that all apotemnophiliacs are sexually motivated. Apotemnophilia has also 
been likened to body dysmorphic disorder and transsexuality: in both cases body image and 
identity seem to be o f more importance than sexual gratification. (Elliott 2000) 
Apotemnophilia should be distinguished from acrotomophilia, a sexual attraction to 
amputees; acrotomophiliacs online are known as ‘devotees’ . It seems that apotemnophiliacs, 
like transgendered individuals, see themselves as being trapped in the wrong kind o f body. 
The only thing that will satisfy them is changing their body to match their self-image. In the 
case o f apotemnophiliacs, this means having a limb removed. If that means removing it 
themselves, many will go to that extreme.
Plainly, cases o f apotemnophilia raise issues for a number o f disciplines. What is o f  interest 
to us is the question o f whether there is a case for legal intervention in medically assisted 
elective amputations such as those earned out by Dr Smith. Should they be allowed to have 
the limb amputated, or should this be prevented, for their own good? The case is an 
interesting one because o f the level o f harm the individuals wish to have performed upon 
them, and the paternalistic ‘purity’ o f any intervention. Unlike tattooing, piercing, and many 
cosmetic surgeries, the harm involved is serious and permanent, but it is not as serious or 
permanent as euthanasia. It is therefore more difficult to make both the argument that surgical 
amputation o f a limb is a private choice to be respected, and the argument that it is the 
product o f a depressed state, and that the apotemnophiliacs are therefore incompetent to make 
the decision. By paternalistic ‘purity’ I mean that the motivation for any intervention in this 
choice would be largely paternalistic. Contrast the case o f cigarette smoking. Though a policy 
o f heavy taxation on cigarettes may have some basis in legal paternalism, there is a good 
argument for it from the burden on public health systems o f the largely inevitable diseases o f 
a large number o f smokers. Apotemnophiliacs, however, are few, and the possible burden on 
the state o f their disability is so negligible that it may be ignored. (As we accept the burden o f 
those who choose to play dangerous sports.)
In current British law a person cannot consent to harm beyond a certain level o f  seriousness, 
and the amputation o f a limb certainly falls beyond this threshold. In general, an act is 
permissible if it is consensual, but the current law places constraints on this principle o f 
consensuality. “Starting from the premise that an assault necessarily entails the absence of
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consent” , Kell writes, “ the general rule is that when the injury caused...by the consensual, 
dangerous conduct, reaches the level o f ‘bodily harm’ , as defined, the consent o f the 
participants is rendered ineffective, and, consequently, incapable o f preventing criminal 
liability attaching” (Kell 121). Bodily harm is defined as harm beyond the merely “ transient 
and trifling” . The law bailing consent to harm beyond a certain point seems to be 
paternalistic: if the motivations for the law are as they seem, then it fulfils all our criteria for 
paternalistic state action. The state aims to bring it about that with respect to some state(s) o f 
affairs which concerns Q ’ s own good Q ’ s choice or opportunity to choose is denied or 
diminished. A  person who wishes to have harm beyond the level o f transient and trifling 
performed upon them is not legally able to do so. The state’ s belief that this policy or law 
promotes the good o f Q is the main reason for the implementation o f that policy or law; we 
can, for the purposes o f discussion, discount other reasons (such as public liability) the state 
may have for imposing such a restraint on the principle o f consent. Finally, the state 
discounts any belief Q might have that its law or policy does not promote Q ’ s good. Those 
who desire to have harm performed upon them clearly believe that it is in their own interests.
3.7 Paternalism and the choices of competent individuals
But what sort o f paternalism is it? Presumptively unjustified paternalism on Buchanan and 
Brock’ s model involves the usurpation o f the choices o f competent adults, while justified 
paternalism involves interference in decisions made by people who are incompetent to make 
those decisions. So whether or not the law disallowing consent to haim beyond a certain level 
o f  seriousness is presumptively justified or unjustified according to their model depends on 
the competence o f those affected by it.
The case against paternalistic interference in the choices o f entirely competent individuals has 
been argued more eloquently and more persuasively than I can hope to match by liberal 
thinkers such as Mill. It is not the law’ s part to impose the state’ s conception o f the good on 
competent adults at the expense o f their self-determination. The point o f M ill’ s Haim 
Principle is that it is dangerous to give the law power over the self-determination o f an 
individual. This is not to say that the state can have no role in promoting as well as protecting 
the well-being o f citizens. Mill writes that
“ the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member o f a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
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either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot rightfully be 
compelled to do or forbear* because it will be better for him to do so, because it will 
make him happier, because, in the opinion o f others, to do so would be wise, 01* even 
right. These are good reasons for remonstrating with him, or reasoning with him, or 
persuading him, 01* entreating him, but not for compelling him, or visiting him with 
any evil, in case he does otherwise” (Mill 15).
Just as a person may entreat 01* reason with friends to try to get them to stop smoking or 
drinking, society can use methods other than force or coercion to try to improve the well­
being o f citizens. The least coercive and most effective means society has at its disposal is 
probably education. But the use o f the law to attempt to promote the good o f competent 
adults at the expense o f their self-determination is unjustifiable. I will go into the liberal 
arguments against this variety o f paternalism in more detail further along.
3.8 Paternalism and the choices of incompetent individuals
If the law bailing consent to harm beyond a certain level cannot be justified when it is 
understood as an instance o f paternalistic interference in competent choices, we might wish to 
interpret it as ranging over the choices o f incompetents. The people affected by the law are 
those who wish to contract to have a fairly extreme harm caused to themselves; the choice at 
stake is the choice to enter into such a contract. For the law to be a genuine case o f 
presumptively justified paternalism, it must be based on the assumption that all those affected 
by it are incompetent to make the particular decision to contract to have harm done to them. 
Given the fact that the law covers all sorts o f cases where people contract to all sorts o f 
different harms, the only possible grounding for the assumption o f incompetence is that the 
very decision to contract to have harm caused to oneself beyond the level o f  bodily harm, is 
evidence for or constitutive o f incompetence beyond the threshold level.
Alternatively, a law might be put into effect that only those judged competent by medical 
professionals be allowed to contract to have extreme harm such as the amputation o f a limb 
performed upon them. In this case, the restrictive law would clearly apply only to those 
judged incompetent to make the decision. But on Buchanan and Brock’ s risk-related model, 
apotemnophiliacs will be likely to be judged incompetent simply because o f the extreme and 
irreversible nature o f the harm they wish to have performed. Thus contracting to have a 
healthy limb amputated is effectively ruled out in either case.
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W e might be tempted to the view that this restriction is warranted when we look at the case o f 
apotemnophilia. The consequences o f the loss o f a limb are so dire that it may be thought that 
anyone who desires the amputation o f a healthy limb is obviously incompetent to make the 
choice, and the legal restriction on this choice is justified. Not only will the individual have to 
face the pain, risk, and physical restrictions that result from a major surgery, but they will 
have difficulty with mobility and probably social acceptance for the rest o f their life. 
Moreover, if we have trouble believing in the force o f the apotemnophiliac’ s positive 
justification for surgery, then we will not accept that the decision has any merits to outweigh 
its negative impact.
But even in such an extreme case o f the desire to self-harm as apotemnophilia, there are a 
number o f considerations against this view. The apotemnophiliac desire for amputation is so 
strong that many sufferers will attempt to remove the limb themselves, or at least inflict such 
grave injury on themselves that amputation is the only option for the doctors to whom they 
turn. As well as the cases mentioned at the beginning o f this chapter, there are reports o f 
apotemnophiliacs who have attempted or seriously consider shooting their legs off, lying on 
railway tracks and attempting to induce gangrene in serious self-inflicted wounds. These are 
pragmatic reasons for failing to implement a justified paternalistic policy, as is the fact that 
there is no known cure for apotemnophilia. So far psychotherapy has not succeeded in 
diminishing the desire to have limbs amputated.
But those who have succeeded in having the limb amputated report great relief. Thus 
amputation, though it can hardly be seen as a ‘cure’ in the usual sense, is currently the best 
possible outcome for genuine apotemnophiliacs. The fact that apotemnophiliacs report 
satisfaction post-amputation tells against the view that, pre-surgery, they do not fully 
comprehend the consequences o f their proposed act. In fact it appears that they appreciate the 
consequences better than anyone else does. The apotemnophiliac view o f the matter is clearly 
that life will be better without the limb, whatever it takes. Carl Elliott spoke to some 
sufferers:
“ there is a simple, relentless logic to these people’ s requests for amputation. “ I am 
suffering” , they tell me. “ I have nowhere else to turn.” They realize that life as an 
amputee will not be easy. They understand the problems they will have with 
mobility, with work, with their social lives; they realize they will have to make
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countless adjustments just to get through the day. They are willing to pay their own 
way. Their bodies belong to them, they tell me. The choice should be theirs. What is 
worse: to live without a leg or to live with an obsession that controls your life? For 
at least some o f them, the choice is clear which is why they are talking about chain 
saws and shotguns and railroad tracks.”  (Elliott)
There is a strong case to be made that apotemnophiliacs know exactly what they are doing 
when they choose to have a healthy limb amputated. If this is the case -  if  they are competent 
to make the decision to be harmed -  then paternalistic legal intervention is not justified to 
prevent them entering into a contract with a doctor who will provide this service.
There is something disturbing about the desire o f a person to inflict harm on his own body, or 
have such harm inflicted upon him, especially when the desire for harm is obvious and the 
harm desired extreme. When the harm is beyond “ transient and trifling” even the liberal 
thinker might be sorely tempted to agree that the person’ s self-determination in this case may 
be set aside. After all, even Mill allowed that we may intervene for the protection o f 
incompetents. In effect, (if it is to be interpreted as a case o f justified paternalism) the law 
disallowing consent to bodily harm stipulates a threshold for competence based on the 
underlying values o f self-determination and the good o f the individuals involved. It says that 
the decision to consent to such a harm may be justifiably overlooked; the good o f these 
people is too important for us to judge them competent in this regard. But the fact that we can 
call into question the incompetence o f people who wish to have healthy limbs amputated 
shows that there is something fishy about this method o f stipulating a threshold for 
incompetence.
If, as it seems, amputation is indeed the best possible outcome for apotemnophiliacs, it is a 
vivid example o f what is wrong with the risk-related standards o f competence proposed by 
Buchanan and Brock. Since the harm desired in this case is so extreme -  the amputation o f a 
limb -  on their model apotemnophiliacs are likely to be judged incompetent to make the 
decision. It would be hard to deny that harm is being done, on our usual standards o f what is 
harmful, even though the patients are satisfied with the post-operative state o f affairs. But on 
all other grounds, including pragmatic, it seems that they should be given the responsibility 
for their own decision, provided they have sufficient mental capacity to make it. Competence 
is not a function o f the riskiness o f choices, and nor is the freedom that we are taking to hinge 
on the responsibility individuals take for their choices.
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3.9 Conclusion
In medical practice and in medicine for the law, decision-making competence is what sets o ff 
those choices for which we are held responsible from those for which we need not or cannot 
take responsibility. As such, determinations o f competence promise to provide the sort o f 
separation between voluntary and non-voluntary choices that proved so elusive. Some models 
o f  competence are based on the riskiness o f the choices involved, especially in borderline 
cases o f competence, where thresholds must be set rather than discovered. But these models -  
and the model advocated by Buchanan and Brock in Deciding fo r  Others in particular -  seem 
to let hard paternalism in the back door. The decision as to whether an individual is 
competent to make a certain decision should not have anything to do with the riskiness o f the 
decision, unless that riskiness makes it harder to comprehend the outcome o f the choice. And 
it is equally absurd to suppose that riskiness has anything to do with the voluntariness with 
which a choice is made. These points were illustrated by the case o f apotemnophilia, a 
proposed contract to have extreme harm performed upon one.
In current British law a person cannot consent to harm beyond the level o f ‘bodily harm’ , 
which is defined as harm more serious than merely transient and trifling. Apotemnophiliacs 
under this law may be prohibited from contracting with a doctor to have a limb removed. The 
basis for the law is paternalistic; it conforms to the definition outlined in Chapter 1 .1 argued 
briefly that if it is considered as an instance o f paternalistic interference in a competent 
decision then it is unjustifiable -  the law should not be concerned with prohibiting competent 
adults from carrying out their own life plans, “ for their own good” . To interpret the law as 
presumptively justified paternalism, we must read it as having stipulated a threshold o f 
competence, which apotemnophiliacs (and all who wish to be harmed beyond a certain level) 
fail to meet: the desire for this level o f  harm is taken as constitutive o f or overwhelming 
evidence for incompetence. In this stipulation the law sets a higher value on the good rather 
than the self-determination o f those who wish to harm themselves.
But the incompetence o f apotemnophiliacs can be called into question. It seems that in fact 
they do know better than anyone else what is good for them. They have a problem and there 
is currently only one solution: amputation is thus the best possible outcome at present for 
apotemnophiliacs. In stipulating a high threshold o f competence based on valuing the good o f 
apotemnophiliacs over self-determination, the law has failed to satisfy either. The
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competence o f apotemnophiliacs really has nothing to do with the extreme harm they wish to 
have done to them; they do not fail to be responsible for their actions simply because they are 
dangerous and have far-reaching consequences.
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Chapter 4
4.0 Introduction
Buchanan and Brock attempt to say exactly when we may justifiably decide for others. They 
claim that self-determination and the good o f the individual concerned are values to be 
balanced, and that the exact nature o f the balancing depends on features o f the particular 
situation. But this kind o f particularism about the ethics o f paternalism seems likely to let hard 
paternalism in through the back door. That is, unless there is an independent theory o f how 
self-determination and overall good should balance, it is open to those in positions o f power to 
decide against the self-determination o f individuals whenever they disapprove of, or fail to 
understand, the choice being made.
In this chapter I explore some normative theoretical questions which underpin the high 
evaluation o f self-determination or sovereignty that is necessary for anti-paternalism at the 
level o f legal theory.. J.S. Mill vehemently rejects any imposition o f the state on (what we now 
call) self-determination, when the choices in question are purely self-regarding, and M ill’ s On 
Liberty is a classic, complex and sustained argument against such impositions. But a puzzling 
aspect o f M ill’ s philosophy is the apparent conflict between his principle o f utility and the 
strong anti-paternalism he expresses in On Liberty.
M ill’ s consequentialism takes happiness to be the value to be maximised; the principle o f 
utility says “ actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they 
tend to produce the reverse o f happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence 
o f pain; by unhappiness, pain, and the privation o f pleasure” (Mill U 55). M ill’ s anti­
paternalist stance is demonstrated when he says that the only justification for state 
intervention in the private life o f a citizen is to prevent harm to others -  “ his own good, either 
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant”  (OL 68). But prima facie  there will be occasions 
where the increase in utility brought about by preventing someone from harming herself in 
fact outweighs that o f allowing her to do as she pleases.
One response to this puzzle is to attempt to ground an extremely strong, if not absolute, ban 
on paternalism in a non-hedonistic consequentialism. In other words, happiness is not the sole
aim in the consequentialist weighing o f right actions. Such a view might take self­
determination to be one value among a number to be promoted. This position has intuitive 
merits, but may more resemble an intuitionistic pluralism like that o f Buchanan and Brock 
than the robust consequentialism for which Mill aimed.
In the final part o f this chapter I look at a different sort o f consequentialism, that is intended to 
be applicable across all areas o f government. Philip Pettit’ s republicanism is a 
consequentialist theory that takes dominion, a version o f freedom, as its goal to be maximised. 
I explore the ramifications o f this theory on legal paternalism. Though there are some 
problems remaining with the theory as a whole, Pettit’ s republicanism turns out to entail an 
absolute ban on paternalistic law.
In this chapter I will be focussing on possible consequentialist groundings for strong views 
against paternalism. This is partly because o f the prevalence o f consequentialist thinking in 
actual policy-making, and because consequentialist thinking seems legitimate for issues o f 
law and politics, since these concern the welfare o f a large number o f people. Deontological 
reasoning, on the other hand, seems ideally suited to telling individuals how to treat others. 
The state seems to have duties beyond that o f an individual, and may legitimately take 
liberties that individuals may not and possibly override principles that individuals may not. 
Thus, though it may be easy to frame this debate in terms o f principles o f autonomy and 
benevolence, it is necessary to understand how it can be framed in consequentialist terms, in 
order that the state as well as individuals have a strong theoretical undeipinning to their 
actions.
4.1 Mill on paternalism
It’ s unlikely that Mill had anything like apotemnophilia in mind when he wrote the second 
part o f his famous principle -  that “ the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member o f a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to 
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant” (OL 68) [my 
emphasis]. He probably was not considering extreme sadomasochistic violence, either. But 
M ill’ s arguments apply equally well to these practises as to whatever outrageous ways o f 
living he had in mind when he wrote On Liberty. The sexual and physical extremes o f recent 
times (and here I’m thinking, as well as o f apotemnophilia, o f  bodily modification such as
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having homs surgically implanted in one’ s head for the purposes o f performance art) are 
simply variations on the age-old themes o f subculture and eccentricity. They can be accepted 
as such because they harm no-one but those who engage in them, and (I would argue) benefit 
those who engage in them either enough to make up for harming them, or through harming 
them.
It is natural to conceive o f  the puzzle about paternalism in terms o f the competing values of 
self-determination and beneficence, as Buchanan and Brock did. Beneficence demands that 
we prevent people from being harmed, yet a respect for their self-determination pulls us in the 
opposite direction. In the case o f fully competent adults there should be a strong presumption 
in favour o f self-determination -  that is, a strong resistance to paternalism, which becomes 
sharpest when one considers interference in one’ s own choices, for one’ s own good. As 
Feinberg puts it, “ the reader would not welcome having his own judgment overruled, or the 
“ better values” o f others substituted for his own” (Feinberg 62).
M ill’ s objection to paternalism is based on a number o f strands o f thought. W e can first 
identify the one that is fairly straightforwardly utilitarian in character. First, Mill argues that a 
person is more likely to know his or her own good better than anyone else:
“neither one person, nor any number o f persons, is warranted in saying to another 
human creature o f ripe years that he shall not do with his life for his own benefit 
what he chooses to do with it. He is the person most interested in his own well-being: 
the interest which any other person, except in cases o f strong personal attachment, 
can have in it is trifling compared with that which he himself has; the interest which 
society has in him individually (except as to his conduct to others) is fractional and 
altogether indirect, while with respect to his own feelings and circumstances the most 
ordinary man or woman has means o f knowledge immeasurably surpassing those that 
can be possessed by anyone else” (OL 141-142).
Paternalistic interference, therefore, is likely to decrease the well-being o f its object, because 
that person is more likely to know what is best for him.
O f course, since M ill’ s utilitarianism takes happiness (pleasure and the absence o f pain) as its 
goal to be maximised, this argument is not straightforwardly utilitarian. To make it so, we 
must read ‘well-being’ as ‘happiness’ -  so the individual is taken to know what will make him 
happy more than anyone else will. This can be granted without too much dispute. Paternalistic
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interference will tend to decrease the happiness o f those whose choices are infringed upon, 
because they are likely to know what makes them happy better than anyone else does.
The arguments from ‘individuality’ are a little more complicated. The exercise o f choice, 
according to Mill, allows a person to develop into a more valuable human being. This person 
will display the qualities o f observation, reasoning and judgment, activity, discrimination, and 
firmness and self-control, rather than those o f “ ape-like” imitation. “ It is possible that he 
might be guided in some good path, and kept out o f harm’ s way, without any o f [the former 
qualities]. But what will be his comparative worth as a human being?” (OL 123) The person 
who has developed these personal characteristics by living out his or her own choices is M ill’ s 
ideal ‘ individual’ .
The relationship between individuality and utility is complex. We can probably safely take 
Mill to hold at least that the utility o f a society comprised of individuals has the potential to be 
greater than one comprised o f ‘sheep’ . “ As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there 
should be different opinions, so it is that there should be different experiments o f living.” 
Further, Mill argues that “ these developed human beings are o f some use to the undeveloped - 
.. .to those who do not desire liberty, and would not avail themselves o f it”  (OL128-129). 
Those few who are original are “ the salt o f the earth; without them, human life would become 
a stagnant pool.” (OL 129) John Skorupski writes that “Much o f what is most passionately felt 
in M ill’ s political philosophy is threaded on this strand -  the idea o f a society o f human beings 
fully and variously developed, morally vigorous, self-determining.”  (Skorupski 338) All well 
and good -  but in the context o f utilitarianism as the doctrine o f happiness-maximisation, this 
means that a society o f individuals, or a mixture o f individuals and others, will have a greater 
overall share o f happiness than a more restrictive one.
Already we can see the difficulties Mill might have in reconciling the views expressed in On 
Liberty with those o f Utilitarianism. The very potent rhetoric o f On Liberty (“his comparative 
worth as a human being” , for instance -  what does that mean for a utilitarian?) defies the kind 
o f analysis common in contemporary philosophy, rather lending itself to interpretations like 
Skorupski’ s that burden the meaning with even greater weight. Mill is propagandising in On 
Liberty, and it seems almost churlish to take him too literally. But there are important ideas in 
the text not explored elsewhere, and it remains to be seen whether they are consistent with 
those expressed in M ill’ s other works. Here we can flag the link between a society o f
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individuals and a happy society. It is a pleasant and optimistic thought that the two are closely 
linked, but one that might be rejected in favour o f the idea that the society o f  individuals -  the 
culturally and intellectually vibrant society -  may be less happy. Further, its happiness might 
not be what we (or Mill, in the end) find valuable about it.
On the level o f the individual, matters are still harder to reconcile with utilitarianism. The title 
o f Chapter 3 -  “ O f Individuality, as one o f the Elements o f Well-Being” -  immediately 
suggests that Mill took individuality as more than instrumental to a person’ s happiness. The 
following passage supports this view: “Where not the person’ s own character but the 
traditions or customs o f other people are the rule o f conduct, there is wanting one o f the 
principal ingredients o f  human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient o f individual and 
social progress” (OL 120) [my emphasis]. On a natural reading o f this passage, Mill means to 
tell us that individuality is a component o f happiness, and can therefore be included directly in 
the utilitarian calculus. But this quite clearly conflicts with M ill’ s hedonistic conception o f 
happiness, stated elsewhere: “ By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence o f pain; by 
unhappiness, pain, and the privation o f pleasure” (U 55).
M ill’ s arguments that 'individuals' are necessary to the progression o f society (with the subtext 
that the progression o f society contributes to everyone’ s happiness) have some force. But the 
utilitarian value to the individual o f individuality is less than clear. Firstly, in many cases 
individuals fail to know their own good better than someone else would. Health-care 
professionals will tend to know what is best for your health better than you yourself do; an 
older person may know what is best for your career (see Archard 1994), Your family may 
know what’ s best for your happiness -  but even if you know what’ s best for your happiness, 
you might act otherwise than to promote it. It is quite easy to imagine a well-developed 
individual, in M ill’ s sense, who does not achieve much hedonistic pleasure. This example also 
works against a second possible reading o f M ill’ s third argument -  it is a counter-example to 
the view that happiness is the necessary result o f becoming a fully-fledged individual. There is 
but a tenuous link between living autonomously and living a life o f  hedonistic pleasure.
It seems, therefore, that M ill’ s strong opposition to paternalism cannot be reconciled to his 
hedonistic consequentialism. The ethical goal o f seeking to increase happiness overall is 
compatible with paternalistic interference in people’ s lives. People need not know best what 
conduces to their own happiness. Nor need self-development (for which liberty is a necessary
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condition) produce happy individuals, though they may increase the happiness o f others. With 
the connection between self-determination and happiness so tenuous, there will clearly be 
instances where to undermine the former is to increase the latter. For instance, it seems we 
will be justified in forcing therapy on a person who is moderately depressed, since this will 
make her (and potentially those close to her) happier. Moreover, hedonistic consequentialism 
justifies a policy  o f  such intervention, since it would appear to promote happiness in every 
case to which it is applied. The recurring problem in reconciling the ideas expressed in On 
Liberty with Utilitarianism seems to be the narrow conception o f the utilitarian goal 
advocated by the latter book. A  strong regard for self-determination cannot be based on 
pleasure and the absence o f pain as the ultimate goal o f all humanity.
4.2 Beyond Happiness
A more substantive link, it has been argued, holds between self-determination and some more 
complicated notion o f well-being. John Skorupski writes that Mill “ would have been in a 
much stronger position if he had seen that the deep-seated response [against interference if no 
harm is being done to others] requires one to acknowledge autonomy as a human end which is 
not simply a part o f happiness, but in its own right a distinct ingredient o f well-being” 
(Skorupski 345). Skorupski goes on to argue that we need not give up a consequentialist basis 
for anti-patemalism -  we simply need a richer, non-hedonistic consequentialism. Mill may 
have been heading in this direction with his analysis o f the parts o f happiness in 
Utilitarianism.
On this sort o f view, it is not just happiness which is to be maximised, but some complex o f 
human ends. If we take autonomy as part o f that complex, we have a prima facie  
consequentialist case against paternalism. But we still do not have a strong anti-paternalism, 
for “  autonomy is only one element o f well-being, [so] the possibility remains open that an 
individual’ s overall utility may be increased by diminishing it. The cost o f his loss o f 
autonomy may be outweighed by the gain to other elements o f his good” (Skorupski 359). 
Skorupski accepts this result - “ Can one seriously deny that such cases do indeed exist?” 
(360) -  but argues that paternalism will not be acceptable in the public sphere, that the 
“menacing indirect consequences o f giving the state or society powers to interfere may indeed 
justify a ban on paternalistic moral practices or laws which is in practise absolute” (360).
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The problem is that this variety o f consequentialism does not even seem to ground the strong 
anti-paternalism which amounts to a practical ban. For autonomy is just one component, 
presumably among many, o f well-being. Health must be another element o f well-being. And 
health and autonomy are at odds whenever a competent person wishes to engage in some 
activity detrimental to her health. Competent persons choose to eat too much, drink too much, 
smoke cigarettes, work too hard, exercise too much, undergo plastic surgery, and consent to 
violent sexual activities. For some o f these excesses it is clear that some other benefit than 
health is being promoted -  it is easy to see how a person’ s well-being might be centred on his 
work, physical abilities, or sexual identity. But a competent person may even choose not to 
further any aspect o f her well-being. This free spirit actively chooses a life where she fails to 
take account o f the consequences o f her action. On this view we will in many cases be 
justified in intervening in order to promote some other aspect o f her well-being. The true 
altruist acts to promote some other person’ s good -  on this view we are justified in preventing 
this if we can more greatly increase the altruist’ s well-being than he would have increased his 
recipient’ s. On a smaller scale, most o f us are at least part altruist and part free spirit. These 
moments in which we choose to act against our own best interests are not aberrations to be 
prevented by some outside agency, but choices that contribute to our character just as do all 
our others. But a consequentialism which takes autonomy to be but one o f a number o f values 
to be maximised cannot sustain a case against such instances o f paternalistic interference.
A natural response might be to try to give autonomy a higher place in the list o f values to be 
maximised than any or many o f the others. Thus, perhaps, we might be able to say that well­
being is to be maximised, but only insofar as autonomy is not interfered with. However, this 
amounts to a second, non-consequentialist principle to add to that o f maximising well-being -  
the view is no longer a pure consequentialism. This highlights a general problem with 
versions o f consequentialism that take more than one value as their goal -  like intuitionist 
positions in ethics, they can provide no satisfactory way o f dealing with conflicts between 
goals. The catch-all term ‘well-being’ may promise a single goal for the consequentialist, but 
the reality is that well-being is a complex, whose elements often conflict. If this complicated 
consequentialism is not intuitionism in sheep’ s clothing, it at least faces the same deep 
problem o f being unable to provide any system o f ranking values.
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4.3 Paternalism and freedom
In their 1976 paper, Bernard Gert and Charles Culver make the point that paternalism cannot 
be characterised in terms o f a limitation on freedom. Their point is that there are acts which 
intuitively should fall under the concept o f paternalism, and yet which do not limit freedom. 
They give the following example:
“Mi\ N, a member o f a religious sect that does not believe in blood transfusions, is 
involved in a serious automobile accident and loses a large amount o f blood. On 
arriving at the hospital, he is still conscious and informs the doctor o f his views on 
blood transfusion. Immediately thereafter he faints from loss o f blood. The doctor 
believes that if  Mr. N  is not given a transfusion he will die. Thereupon while Mr. N  is 
still unconscious, the doctor arranges for and carries out the blood transfusion” (Gert 
and Culver 46).
Since the patient was unconscious, Gert and Culver argue, the doctor’ s act was not an 
imposition on the patient’ s freedom. This point was taken into consideration when framing 
our definition o f  paternalism, understanding it as Archard does in terms o f usurpation o f 
choice rather than limitation o f freedom.
4.4 Two concepts of liberty
When Gert and Culver argue that limitation o f freedom is not the defining feature o f 
paternalism, they are dealing with a standard conception o f freedom -  “ liberty o f action” -  
which can be identified as Isaiah Berlin’ s ‘negative’ liberty. In an influential essay, Berlin 
argues that two conceptions o f liberty have become entangled, and that only one is a fit 
concern o f the state.
Berlin characterises negative freedom as follows:
“I am normally said to be free to the degree to which no man or body o f men 
interferes with my activity. Political liberty in this sense is simply the area within 
which a man can act unobstructed by others, If I am prevented by others from doing 
what I could otherwise do, I am to that degree unfree” (Berlin 393).
Freedom in this negative sense is often thought to be curtailed by law to some extent in order 
to promote some other values, for instance, justice, security, or equality.
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“This is what the classical English political philosophers meant when they used this 
word [ ‘freedom’ ]. They disagreed about how wide the area [of non-interference] 
could or should be. They supposed that it could not, as things were, be unlimited, 
because if it were, it would entail a state in which all men could boundlessly interfere 
with all other men; and this ldnd o f ‘natural’ freedom would lead to social chaos in 
which men’ s minimum needs would not be satisfied; or else the liberties o f the weak 
would be suppressed by the strong” (Berlin 393).
Where this conception o f freedom is taken as paramount, the role o f the state is to perform a 
balancing act. On the one hand, any imposition by law is curtailment o f negative liberty, and 
to that extent is immediately in need o f justification. On the other hand, without law there can 
be no harmony in the interests o f individuals. Hobbes took this harmonisation o f interests to 
justify a strong imposition on ‘natural’ liberty: only an absolute sovereign could save 
humanity from the constant state o f war that is the result o f their nature.
“The final Cause, End, or Designe o f men (who naturally love Liberty, and 
Dominion over others,) in the introduction o f that restraint upon themselves, (in 
which wee see them live in Commonwealths,) is the foresight o f their own 
preservation, and o f a more contented life thereby; that is to say, o f  getting 
themselves out from that miserable condition o f Warre, which is necessarily 
consequent (as hath been shewn) to the naturall Passions o f men, when there is no 
visible power to keep them in awe, and tye them by fear o f punishment to the 
performance o f their Covenants” (Hobbes 117).
In short, “ the greatest [worst] that in any forme o f Govemement can possibly happen to the 
people in generall, is scarce sensible, in respect o f the miseries, and horrible calamities, that 
accompany a Civill Warre” (Hobbes 128).
M ill’ s rather more optimistic view o f human nature and human endeavour led to a more 
minimalistic conception o f the state. As we have seen, Mill put great emphasis on the value o f 
liberty as instrumental to happiness, and happiness is the consequentialist goal o f M ill’ s 
ethical utilitarianism. The ethical state, then, will take the maximisation o f happiness as its 
goal, and concomitantly, liberty will be restricted to the smallest extent compatible with 
maximising happiness. Thus M ill’ s theory allowed the interference o f the state by law only to 
prevent haim being inflicted by one citizen on another.
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However, according to Berlin, negative freedom is not the only conception o f freedom in the 
history o f political thought. ‘Positive5 freedom is minimally construed as requiring the 
presence rather than the absence o f some factor, though it is sometimes difficult to get a grasp 
on exactly what this additional factor might be. Berlin elucidates to some extent:
“The positive sense o f the word ‘liberty5 derives from the wish on the part o f the 
individual to be his own master. I wish my life and decisions to depend on myself, 
not on external forces o f whatever kind. I wish to be the instrument o f my own, not 
o f other men’ s, acts o f will55 (Berlin 397).
However, it might be argued that the desire for negative liberty -  freedom from interference -  
results from exactly the same wish in the part o f the individual. The positive aspect o f this 
sense o f ‘ liberty5 must be brought into relief. Berlin writes:
“ One way o f making this clear is in terms o f the independent momentum which the, 
initially perhaps quite harmless, metaphor o f self-mastery... [The] dominant self is 
then variously identified with reason, with my ‘higher nature5, with the self which 
calculates and aims at what will satisfy it in the long run, with my ‘real5 or ‘ ideal5 or 
‘autonomous5 self, or with my self ‘at its best555 (397).
This metaphorical language, Berlin argues, draws us into a state o f mind whereby we can see 
a justification for all lands o f oppression on behalf o f ‘real5 selves, on behalf, in fact, o f the 
positive freedom o f those we oppress. With characteristic vigour, Berlin writes that
“This monstrous impersonation, which consists in equating what X  would choose if 
he were something he is not, or at least not yet, with what X  actually seeks and 
chooses, is at the heart o f  all political theories o f self-realization. It is one thing to say 
that I may be coerced for my own good which I am too blind to see: this may, on 
occasion, be for my benefit; indeed it may enlarge the scope o f my liberty. It is 
another to say that if it is my good, then I am not being coerced, for I have willed it, 
whether I know this or not, and am free (or ‘truly5 free) even while my poor earthly 
body and foolish mind bitterly reject it, and struggle against those who seek however 
benevolently to impose it, with the greatest desperation.”  [398]
This view takes paternalistic interference as non-coercive because it is for the person's own 
good. We saw (and rejected) earlier an attempt to justify paternalistic action in similar 
grounds -  not only was paternalism taken to be for the recipient’ s good, it was taken to be 
ultimately their choice. The basis for this view was the same body o f metaphor, o f ‘real5 and 
‘base5 selves, taken to the same literal extremes.
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4.5 A third concept of liberty
The notion o f liberty that Gert and Culver argue is not necessarily infringed by paternalistic 
intervention -  the notion o f liberty o f action -  is clearly identical with Berlin’ s concept o f 
negative liberty. And it is correct to say that, in this sense, paternalistic interference need not 
involve an imposition on liberty. But it has been argued that Berlin’ s characterisation does not 
exhaust the possibilities o f what we mean when we talk about liberty. In particular, Philip 
Pettit has argued that there is a third form o f liberty that is even more worth pursuing than 
Berlin’ s negative liberty.
Pettit conceives o f freedom as non-domination, the absence o f mastery by another.
“This conception is negative to the extent that it requires the absence o f domination 
by others, not necessarily the presence o f self-mastery, whatever that is thought to 
involve. The conception is positive to the extent that, at least in one respect, it needs 
something more than the absence o f interference; it requires security against 
interference, in particular* against interference on an arbitrary basis” (Pettit 1997 51). 
According to Pettit, there are three components o f any relationship o f domination. The 
dominator has 1) the capacity to interfere 2) on an arbitrary basis 3) in certain choices that the 
other is in a position to make (52). The absence o f domination so characterised is freedom as 
non-domination.
Interference is characterised as being intentional, and (for Pettit at least) negative: 
“ Interference cannot take the form o f a bribe or reward; when I interfere I make things worse 
for you, not better” (52). I am sceptical about this characterisation o f interference, but let’ s 
leave it for the moment -  the problem will come out when we talk about arbitrariness. Pettit’ s 
focus on the capacity o f  the dominator to interfere brings out one clear difference with the 
notion o f negative liberty. For a person to be unfree in the sense o f negative liberty, they must 
be interfered with. But for a person to be unfree in the sense o f non-domination, there need 
only be the capacity for someone to arbitrarily interfere in their choices -  this is Pettit’ s ‘non­
interfering dominator’ .
“What constitutes domination is the fact that in some respect the power-bearer has 
the capacity to interfere arbitrarily, even if they are never going to do so. This fact 
means that the power-victim acts in the relevant area by the leave, explicit or 
implicit, o f the power-bearer; it means that they live at the mercy o f that person, that
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they are in the position o f a dependent or debtor or something o f the kind. If there is 
common knowledge o f that implication, as there usually will be, it follows that the 
power-victim cannot enjoy the psychological status o f an equal: they are in a position 
where fear and deference will be the normal order o f the day, not the frankness that 
goes with intersubjective equality”  (63-64).
For Pettit, the threat o f interference can itself constitute unfreedom. For freedom to be 
realised, interference must be impossible, not merely unlikely.
But there is another striking difference between freedom as non-domination and negative 
freedom, brought out by the second clause in Pettit’ s definition o f domination. That is that just 
as there may be a non-interfering dominator who reduces freedom as non-domination, so may 
there be a non-dominating interferer, who does not reduce freedom as non-domination. For 
the negative libertarian, every interference is an imposition on freedom. But for Pettit, only 
arbitrary interference (or the capacity to arbitrarily interfere) imposes on freedom as non­
domination. Ideally, the state will be an example o f a non-dominating interferer, having the 
capacity to interfere in the lives o f individuals but not on an arbitrary basis. It is therefore 
crucially important to understand what Pettit means by non-arbitrary interference.
“When we say that an act o f interference is perpetrated on an arbitrary basis.. .we 
imply that like any arbitrary act it is chosen or not chosen at the agent’ s pleasure.
And in particular, since interference with others is involved, we imply that it is 
chosen or rejected without reference to the interests, or the opinions, o f those 
affected. The choice is not forced to track what the interests o f those others require 
according to their own judgements” (55).
A  non-arbitrary interference will track the interests -  on their own estimation -  o f the person 
interfered with, “ O r... [is] at least forced to track the relevant ones” (55).
There is a certain degree o f tension between the ideas o f freedom as non-domination and an 
extensive welfare state, both o f which Pettit wishes to support. He needs to ensure that the 
interference required by an extensive state is non-dominating. To be non-dominating, the 
interference must be non-arbitrary, and at times the notion o f non-arbitrariness seems to be 
stretched to accommodate this need.
“ I may have an interest in the state imposing certain taxes or in punishing certain 
offenders, for example, and the state may pursue these ends according to procedures 
that conform to my ideas about appropriate means. But I might still not want the state
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to impose taxes on me - 1 may want to be an exception -  or I may think that I ought 
not to be punished in the appropriate manner, even though I have been convicted o f 
an offence. In such a case, my relevant interests and ideas will be those that are 
^  shared in common with others, not those that treat me as exceptional, since the state
* is meant to serve others as well as me. And so in these cases the interference o f the
y state in taxing or punishing me will not be conducted on an arbitrary basis and will
not represent domination” (55-56).
h
But what o f the person who genuinely (though erroneously) estimates their own interests as 
being free o f taxation? Is this person dominated under Pettit’ s system o f government? Not, 
according to Pettit, if there are effective channels for them to contest the law.
T>\ “Happily, a little reflection shows that what is required for non-arbitrariness in the
iv exercise o f a certain power is not actual consent to that sort o f power but the
permanent possibility o f effectively contesting it. [...]  Unless such contestability is 
assured, the state may easily represent a dominating presence for those o f a certain 
marginalized ethnicity or culture or gender” (63).
I am not entirely convinced that a person with interests different from those o f the majority 
will still not be dominated under Pettit’ s system, but the important thing for us to note is that 
the focus on a person’ s interests in their own estimation has been maintained: Pettit’ s state, 
though it allows interference in the interests o f its citizens, is not perfectionistic.
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4.6 Freedom and consequentialism
Pettit, like Mill, is a philosophical consequentialist. But where Mill takes maximising 
happiness to be the goal o f the ethical state, Pettit believes that the state should maximise 
freedom as non-domination. W e saw earlier that there was some difficulty with a 
consequentialist theory sustaining a robust anti-paternalism -  one might think that a theory o f 
constraints rather than a theory o f goals is more suited to the task. Pettit’ s consequentialism, 
with its goal o f non-domination, at least promises to do better, for domination seems to be 
related to paternalism in way that simple interference is not (on this more later.)
Pettit, with John Braithwaite, defends a consequentialist approach (in this case, for the 
criminal justice system) in Not Just Deserts. Braithwaite and Pettit argue that constraints on 
an agent’ s behaviour (such as ‘do not punish the innocent’ ), usually associated with
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deontological theories, can be derived from their consequentialist theory o f punishment, 
which takes ‘dominion’ (an earlier version o f non-domination) as its goal.
“It ought to be clear that the target will motivate a legal allocation o f uncontroversial 
rights. If dominion is to be promoted by legal sanction, then certain negative liberties 
must certainly be legally protected. Their protection means that citizens will have a 
legal claim on the state to defend such liberties. More specifically, given how the law 
works, it means that they will have a claim which legally constrains the state rather 
than just providing it with a target: the state will not be able to excuse inaction on the 
grounds that this will better serve the defence o f that sort o f right overall, or the like” 
(Braithwaite and Pettit 71).
It is the nature o f the goal that allows this derivation o f rights. Where the consequentialist goal 
is happiness, or welfare, a state representative might always ask if violating a derived right on 
this occasion will not promote the good overall. But (Braithwaite and Pettit argue) dominion 
is such that an individual violation o f a right cannot be countenanced:
“ it is a goal whose promotion requires the agents o f the system individually and 
collectively to tie their hands in regard to how individuals should be treated and to 
make it clear to people that this is what they are doing. Unless they make such a 
commitment then people generally will become aware that they are likely to have 
their personal dominion invaded if that is for the best overall; and since dominion has 
the subjective dimension, this means that people generally will find that their 
dominion is seriously compromised” (73-74).
Pettit develops this idea further in Republicanism. He argues that dominion has a common 
knowledge feature: when the three conditions o f domination are fulfilled in any degree, any 
one party to the relationship is likely to know about it.' “The conditions may not be articulated 
in full conceptual dress, but the possibilities involved will tend to register on the common 
consciousness” (59).
But non-domination as opposed to dominion as a goal cannot use this common knowledge 
feature to prove that constraints derived from it cannot consistently be violated. Though there 
is a subjective element to domination, it is in no way constitutive o f domination (as Pettit 
conceives o f it). Domination is characterised by the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis 
in the choices o f the dominated. Any violation o f the rights or constraints derived from the 
target o f non-domination will reduce domination, but if it reduced domination by a greater 
degree in some other area, why not violate the right in this instance? For example, if one
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person is dominating a number o f other people, for instance in an employment situation, why 
not arbitrarily interfere to prevent this domination. The answer seems to be in the feature of 
domination that is the capacity to interfere. For the state that has the capacity to interfere in 
that employer’ s life on an arbitrary basis would seem to have the capacity to interfere in 
anyone’ s life. And so, by the definition, the state which can interfere on an arbitrary basis, 
even in an attempt to promote non-domination, actually dominated every citizen. Thus Pettit’ s 
view o f non-domination as a consequentialist target supports constraints on the behaviour o f 
agents to protect their freedom as well as promote it.
4.7 Paternalism and domination
When writing from the perspective o f dominion as a consequentialist target, rather than non­
domination, Braithwaite and Pettit note that legal paternalism may be justified. Regarding 
heroin use, they write:
“ In the long term, addiction will reduce the dominion o f the consensual victim. 
Ultimately, it may give her no choice but to run every aspect o f her life to service the 
habit; it may leave her with no resources to resist the manipulations o f dealers who 
use her money, or pimps who use her body. This means that there is a case to 
consider in favour o f criminalizing heroin use” (97).
Braithwaite and Pettit go on to argue that for reasons o f parsimony, this sort o f case is 
unlikely to be a matter for the criminal justice system (93-94; 97-98). But the fact that there is 
a case for the criminalisation o f heroin use on the dominion model shows that dominion is not 
the version o f negative liberty that Braithwaite and Pettit take it to be.
Braithwaite and Pettit explain that
“Negative liberty involves, roughly, the absence o f interference by others, or at least 
o f interference that is sufficiently intentional, negligent, reckless, or indifferent to 
count as blameworthy or culpable.. .Positive liberty involves something more in 
addition. What more is required varies from one account to another. It may be the 
absence o f physical inability, psychological incapacity, personal ignorance or 
something o f that land” (Braithwaite and Pettit 55).
They take dominion to be a form o f negative liberty.
“The key to understanding the rival republican tradition o f interpretation is to see that 
there is an alternative way o f characterising non-interference. The condition, under
the republican interpretation, is this: that there are others around, and they do not 
interfere. The place o f the negation operator is different in this characterization, for it 
is now required that there are others around who do not interfere; it is not enough if 
there are no others available to interfere” (57).
But if the case o f drug addiction is one where dominion is lost, then dominion must have an 
element o f positive liberty -  the only way that a drug addict’ s dominion could be reduced is if 
an additional psychological element is required for full dominion (this is not true: they say it’ s 
about the dealers and pimps -  but perhaps this is farfetched).
Freedom as non-domination seems to be a less ambiguous goal for the consequentialist to 
pursue. The drug addict is not dominated -  at least not by definition. Her dealer may well be 
in a position o f dominating power, but that is no grounds for criminalizing the use o f  addictive 
substances. What we want now to assess is whether the criminalisation o f  drug use -  the 
paternalistic intervention o f the state -  is an instance o f domination, and to what extent Pettit’ s 
model supports an anti-patemalistic stance.
Whether or not paternalism -  the usuipation o f one’s choices fo r  on e ’s own good  -  counts as 
domination depends on the crucial arbitrariness clause. If the interference is arbitrary then 
paternalistic law goes against the consequentialist goal o f freedom as non-domination. But 
paternalistic law is often arbitrary, provided we stick with Pettit’ s characterisation o f non­
arbitrariness as tracking the interests o f those affected on their own estimation. For 
paternalism tends to involve usurping a choice made by an individual on their own estimation, 
in order to promote (what are felt to be) their actual interests. If arbitrariness involves failing 
to track a person’ s interests on their own estimation, then paternalism is often arbitrary 
intervention in a person’ s choices. As such it is domination.
But it seems that paternalism need not always be domination -  the two are conceptually 
separable. Paternalistic intervention involves the usuipation o f a person’ s choices. Often this 
will mean that their interests are ignored. But it is conceptually possible for paternalistic 
intervention to be non-arbitrary interference in a person’ s choices -  an interference that does 
track their interests, in their own estimation. It seems that the smoker who wants to quit, who 
fervently assures her friend that she wants to quit, and persuades him to look after her money 
on a night out so that she can’ t buy cigarettes, is not dominated when she later begs for cash, 
though she is the subject o f paternalistic intervention.
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4.8 Paternalism and domination II
In Part I, we viewed paternalism as being (in act or in law) motivated by benevolence and in 
tension with self-determination. The idea o f freedom as non-domination adds an extra element 
to this picture. It may give us a new way o f understanding what is wrong with paternalism 
when it is wrong, and why it is sometimes not wrong. On our earlier model, paternalism was 
thought to be wrong insofar as it denied a person’ s self-determination. But paternalism denies 
self-determination by definition, since we argued that most choices have to be seen as 
expressions o f self-determination. Therefore this model failed to give us adequate grounds for 
understanding what is wrong with paternalism when it is wrong, or why it is justified when it 
seems to be.
What if, instead, we understand paternalism as sometimes instantiating a relationship o f 
domination -  sometimes demonstrating the capacity o f a person or state to interfere arbitrarily 
in another’ s choices? As we saw above, many instances o f paternalism are clearly such cases. 
Whenever the interests o f the subject -  in her own estimation -  are not consulted, paternalism 
fits the model o f domination. It is arbitrary, arbitrariness being defined in terms o f non­
consultation o f interests, and by the definition o f paternalism it is interference in the choices 
o f its object.
Understanding paternalism as being wrong when it instantiates a relationship o f domination 
allows us to recognise that cases where individuals ask for their later choices to be usuiped -  
as in the smoking example above -  are unproblematic. Though the later choice o f the smoker 
is interfered with, and to a certain extent her self-determination is interfered with, her interests 
in her own estimation have been consulted, and so the case is not one o f domination. We can 
also see, perhaps, why such wildly differing intuitions are generated when we consider 
paternalism from two perspectives -  that o f the interferer and that o f the interfered-with. 
While the person whose choices have been usuiped without reference to his stated interests 
feels diminished, the usurper may feel aggrandised. She, after all, is put in a position o f power 
with respect to the other person. Best o f all, she can put it all down to benevolence, since her 
action is ‘for his own good.’
But where does this leave us on the issue o f competence? Many thinkers have agreed on the 
idea that paternalism is justified where people are incompetent to make their own decisions.
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Are such instances o f paternalism also instances o f domination? Take first the easier case, 
where an individual is clearly incompetent to make a decision -  a person suffering from 
serious senile dementia, for example. In this case, a person may not even have an estimation 
o f her own interests. If she has a living will or other documentation stating her interests, this 
must be consulted lest interference in her life be arbitrary and therefore dominating. But i f  she 
has no stated interests then her carers must do the best they can -  and it seems unfair to say 
that they dominate her simply because they fail to account for her non-existent statement o f 
her own interests.
A  more difficult case is one where a person who is clearly incompetent has firm interests that 
go against his well-being. This is the case where, traditionally, paternalistic interference has 
been thought to be justified. Take the young man, a schizophrenic, who has become suicidal. 
Should he be hospitalised until he seems stable again? If the interference in his choices is 
arbitrary, then a relationship o f dominance is established, it seems. Though I am hesitant to 
add more complexity to the definition o f non-arbitrariness, we might say that the stated 
interests o f this individual may justifiably be ignored, simply because he is incompetent to 
make decisions. (Compare the case o f a will made when in unsound mind.)
This brings us back to a point made in my third chapter. That is, that if determinations of 
incompetence are to have such a profound effect on our ethical judgements -  if actions which 
are standardly thought, to be unjustified can become justified when the person they are applied 
to is judged to be incompetent -  then determinations o f incompetence themselves must be 
made independently o f the considerations we take into account when judging the rightness or 
wrongness o f the action. A  serious problem with the model explored in the previous section 
was that it made determinations o f competence rest on the very factors that we were trying to 
use to decide whether paternalism was right or wrong. What made paternalism wrong was that 
it was a violation o f self-determination. But where a person was borderline-incompetent, if 
their self-determination was simply judged to be unimportant in comparison with their well­
being, then they were judged incompetent. This is a backwards sort o f  reasoning.
If we can judge a person as incompetent based on their cognitive abilities, this judgement can 
be used to justify ignoring their choices. W e can say that interference in persons' choices, even 
if it goes against their stated interests, is not arbitrary if  they are incompetent to make the 
decision. But our judgment o f their incompetence cannot be based on our simply not liking
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that decision, or thinking that it so goes against their well-being that we are justified in 
ignoring their self-determination. That sort o f judgment o f incompetence really does seem to 
be arbitrary -  in the sense o f being at the whim o f the decision-maker.
4.9 Legal paternalism
On this model o f unjustified paternalism as domination, most if not all instances o f legal 
paternalism will be instances o f domination. To prevent people from harming themselves by 
instituting laws against self-harming behaviour will in many if not most instances be to 
interfere arbitrarily in their choices. But on Pettit’ s model an absolute ban on legal paternalism 
can be derived. For Pettit, the goal o f the state is to maximise non-domination. The state must 
therefore be the apotheosis o f non-domination. But since domination.is not only arbitrary 
interference but the capacity to arbitrarily interfere, there will be an absolute ban on 
paternalism: laws designed to prevent competent people from engaging in self-harming 
behaviour give the state the capacity to interfere in the choices o f competent individuals, 
without reference to their interests in their own estimation.
4.10 Conclusion
W e can’ t accept the general argument that self-determination is instrumentally crucial to a 
people’ s well-being because they know their own good more often than does anyone else; 
often people do not best know their own good. But we can accept M ill’ s cautions about the 
danger o f using the law in any situation where self-determination is at stake. W e cannot, 
either, side with Feinberg and argue that sovereignty is a trumping consideration. W e saw, 
from Buchanan and Brock’ s argument, that other aspects o f well-being refuse to be ignored. 
But we can argue that self-determination is partly constitutive o f well-being, and the two 
should not be seen as opposed. Rather, different elements o f well-being may be opposed.
However, from the perspective o f underlying normative theory, these conclusions are 
problematic. M ill’ s anti-patemalistic stance is apparently in conflict with his hedonistic 
consequentialism, and expanding the target o f the consequentialism to a complex notion of 
well-being doesn’ t help. In simple form this view can’ t ground a strong anti-paternalism, but 
in complex form it faces problems o f ranking elements o f well-being. A  consequentialism that 
takes a complicated form o f well-being as its goal faces the same difficulties that face
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intuitionism. The reasons we gave for valuing self-determination over other elements o f well­
being would have to be introduced as additional principles to the single principle o f 
maximising well-being.
Since Gert and Culver gave the example o f the unconscious man’ s preferences being 
overridden by the paternalistic doctor, paternalism has been kept conceptually separate from 
freedom o f action: a paternalistic act need not be one in which freedom is diminished. The 
notion o f freedom in play here is Isaiah Berlin’ s negative liberty, characterised as the absence 
o f interference by other people. Berlin contrasts negative liberty with positive liberty, 
understood rather vaguely as requiring the presence o f  some additional factor, rather than the 
mere absence o f interference. Berlin describes this additional factor as ‘ self-mastery’ .
But, according to Philip Pettit, Berlin’ s two concepts o f liberty do not exhaust the field, and 
negative liberty does not exhaust the field o f liberties worth pursuing. Pettit describes a third 
concept o f liberty -  liberty as non-domination -  and sets it up as the consequentialist goal o f a 
‘republican’ government. The relationship o f domination involves the capacity o f one party to 
arbitrarily interfere in the choices o f another, where arbitrary interference is understood as 
interference without consultation o f the interests o f the second party, in their own estimation.
Paternalism and domination are clearly closely related, both involving interference with the 
choices o f agents. Paternalism need not be dominating, since it need not involve arbitrary 
interference. Nor, o f course, need domination be paternalistic -  domination need not be for a 
person’ s ‘own good’ , for one thing, and domination may involve only the capacity to 
interfere, while paternalism involves actual interference. But I have argued that the 
perspective o f domination gives us a better understanding o f when paternalism is justified and 
when it is unjustified. Paternalism which instantiates a relationship o f domination is 
unjustified.
This model explains why the positions o f the intervener and the intervened-with are so at 
odds. It also allows us to say that some paternalistic interference with the choices o f 
competent individuals is not wrong, provided it goes along with their expressed interests. It 
helps us to understand why the previously expressed interests o f incompetent patients are so 
important -  they guarantee that interference based on these interests is non-dominating. As for 
determinations o f competence, it has become clear that they must be made independently o f
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judgments o f the justifiability o f paternalism. Once it is determined that a patient is 
incompetent, it seems we can fail to account for their expressed preferences without 
arbitrariness, though great care will be required in determinations o f competence to prevent 
domination.
Finally, on Pettit’ s model o f non-domination as the consequentialist goal o f the republican 
state, legal paternalism can be absolutely banned. For a state which has laws preventing harm 
to self has the capacity to arbitrarily interfere in the lives o f its citizens, and this counts as 
domination. The only paternalistic intervention the state is allowed, in fact, is to fail to uphold 
a contract whereby one party sells himself into slavery. This seems to be the only state action 
which, while (perhaps) dominating itself, prevents domination on a larger scale: “by selling 
rr himself for a slave, he abdicates his liberty; he foregoes any future use o f it beyond that single
r% act. He therefore defeats, in his own case, the very puipose which is the justification of
allowing him to dispose o f him self’ (Mill On Liberty 173). Mill is generally taken to be 
speaking o f a variety o f negative liberty, but his words apply just as well, if not better (since a 
master need not actually interfere with the freedom o f action o f her slave), to liberty as non­
domination.
75
Conclusion
5.0
In this thesis I have taken the question o f the justifiability o f legal paternalism as a starting point 
for explorations of ideas o f freedom and responsibility at a number o f levels. I stalled by 
defining paternalism and setting out the two guiding intuitions o f the thesis, that paternalistic 
intervention in the lives o f competent adults is unwarranted, but may be justified in cases of 
mental incapacity, ignorance, or youth.
These intuitions were given a preliminary formalization in Joel Feinberg’ s theory o f legal 
paternalism. According to Feinberg, paternalism is justified where an action is substantially non­
voluntary, because non-voluntary actions are not expressions o f the trumping right to self­
determination. Paternalistic intervention in the lives o f competent adults is unwarranted because 
o f this right to sovereignty. But cases o f mental incapacity, ignorance and (sometimes) youth are 
cases o f non-voluntary action, and paternalism may be justified.
This exploration o f Feinberg’ s theory demonstrated that there are two aspects to the guiding 
intuitions o f the thesis: the non-ethical or metaphysical aspect, and the ethical aspect. The non- 
ethical aspect requires a division o f actions or choices into two classes -  the voluntary and the 
non-voluntary -  while the ethical aspect imparts a value to one o f the two classes that the other 
lacks. My second chapter explores the non-ethical aspect o f the intuitions, while the third and 
fourth deal with the ethical.
A  problem with Feinberg’ s theory o f when paternalism is justified emerged in my second 
chapter. That is, that there is some difficulty in distinguishing voluntary from non-voluntary 
choices. Feinberg’ s response to this problem is consistent with more than one theory o f freedom 
of the will. I rejected Hairy Frankfurt’ s account as requiring an unrealistic conception of 
individual identity, opting instead to base further investigation on Dennett’ s idea o f freedom as 
created by practises o f attributing responsibility.
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In my third chapter I started to look at some o f these practises o f attributing responsibility. 
Theories o f decision-making competence such as that o f Buchanan and Brock attempt to set out 
exactly when it is appropriate to interfere in the decisions o f individuals. Competence 
determinations are therefore in a sense the creators o f freedom and personal identity, since they 
are the practical element required by Dennett’ s theory. But competence determinations may fail 
on various points, and Buchanan and Brock’ s method fails on one extremely important point. 
That is, the determination o f competence on their account rests on a prior evaluation o f the 
relative weights o f the self-determination and the good o f the person whose competence is in 
question. But their capacity to make decisions is independent o f these factors, and to use them as 
the basis o f the competence determinations risks hard paternalism all over again.
How, then, should we act in the practical arena when it comes to paternalistic intervention? My 
fourth chapter explores possible normative ethical bases for a strong presumption against 
paternalism in the law. I start by looking at the classic anti-patemalist statement -  Mill’ s On 
Liberty -  and pointing out the difficulty o f reconciling Mill’ s views on paternalism with his 
utilitarianism. In short, it seems impossible to obtain a high enough valuation o f self­
determination when happiness as ‘pleasure and the absence o f pain’ is one’ s consequentialist 
goal. Skorupski interprets Mill’ s consequentialism as having some more complex goal, but this 
strategy risks some kind o f pluralism (with which Mill would have been most displeased.)
Finally, we investigated how the law would be affected with respect to paternalism on a 
consequentialist model that takes freedom as non-domination as its goal. Valuing freedom as 
non-domination gives a nonnative basis for rejecting paternalism in all cases except where 
incompetence has been independently determined.
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